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ABSTRACT 
 This study examines the factors that potentially affect the financial 
leverage of listed firms on Vietnamese stock exchanges, and identifies the key 
determinants of the capital structure of these firms. The paper also explores the 
capital structure theories and how they explain capital structure decisions of 
firms worldwide and in Vietnam. Based on a sample of 183 non-financial publicly-
traded firms from 2009 to 2013, this study uses the estimation method with 
fixed-effects model (FEM) to deliver the most reliable factors, and a pooled OLS 
method to assess the impacts of industry classification. The initial nineteen 
explanatory variables represent the factors that potentially determine capital 
structure: business risk, profitability, firm size, growth opportunities, tangibility of 
assets, uniqueness of assets, taxes, non-debt tax shields, industry condition, stock 
market condition, debt market condition, and macroeconomic condition.  
This study identifies that the most reliable and important factors that 
determine the use of debt by Vietnamese listed firms are firm size (+), inflation 
rate (+) as a proxy for macroeconomic condition, tangibility of assets (+), business 
risk (+), stock market return (+) as a proxy for stock market condition; followed by 
the moderately influential factors, including profitability (–), growth opportunities 
(–/+), industry mean leverage (+) as a proxy for industry condition, average 
lending rate (+/–) as a proxy for debt market condition, and uniqueness of assets 
(+). This study maintains that industry classification plays an important role in a 
firm’s leverage. There is strong evidence of a higher level of debt for firms 
belonging to Construction, Construction Materials, Real Estate industries and 
Mineral industries, followed by Manufacturing, Steel, and Plastics and Packaging 
industries. Whether or not firms belong in highly regulated industries also affects 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
Financial capital is necessary to finance firm operations and investments. 
Any firm needs to consider raising capital from two main sources, either 
borrowing from the debt market or using equity. The mixture of debt and equity 
used to finance the firm’s assets is referred to as the “capital structure” of a firm. 
A firm often sets its own target capital structure, which specifies the desired 
financing structure, including how much the firm will borrow, what kinds of debt 
it will carry, and how much capital the shareholders must contribute. In making 
such a financing decision, firms attempt to choose the best financing combination 
which can maximize firm value and work best with the projects they are investing 
in. Yet, the existence of such an optimal capital structure has been a topic long 
disputed among scholars.  
The factors affecting capital structure have been a popular topic of 
research, both theoretically and empirically, around the world. The most 
commonly identified determinants of capital structure include profitability, firm 
size, growth opportunities, tangibility of assets, uniqueness of assets, volatility, 
taxes, industry condition, stock market condition, debt market conditions, 
inflation and other macroeconomic factors. However, these capital structure 
determinants do not always hold similarly across different contexts.  
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B. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
The seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) established the basis for 
the modern paradigm of capital structure, in which the influence of capital 
structure on a firm’s value was examined on the basis of certain assumptions. 
Specifically, their theory suggested that in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, 
agency costs, asymmetry information, and in an efficient market, the value of a 
firm is unaffected by how the firm is financed. However, with presence of taxes 
and ignoring other elements, the value of a firm is positively related to the use 
level of debt financing, because the more debt used, the higher the value of tax 
shields.  
 Following Modigliani and Miller (1958), several theoretical studies have 
been developed on the topic of capital structure. For example, in 1977, Myers 
brought a totally different idea relating to the effects of growth opportunities on 
corporate borrowing behavior. Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined the agency 
relationship, the agency costs of equity and debt, and the trade-off that owners 
and managers face in making decisions between inside and outside equity and 
debt. Another stream of research was initiated by Ross (1977) on how the choice 
of a firm’s capital structure can signal information to outside investors about the 
company, i.e. issuing large debt levels is a signal of higher quality of the firm. The 
work of Myers and Majluf (1984) provides an explanation as to why firms have a 
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tendency to rely on internal sources of funds, and prefer debt over equity when 
external financing is needed. 
With regards to empirical work, Titman and Wessels (1988), using data on 
U.S. companies over the 1974 to 1982 period, made one of the earliest attempts 
to extend empirical study on capital structure by examining a broad range of 
theoretical determinants of capital structure. Following this, Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) investigated the determinants of capital structure decisions on a broader 
scope of major industrialized countries, leveraging the findings of previous 
studies of U.S. firms.  
It can be clearly seen that both theoretical and empirical work has made 
progress in determining what factors influence corporate financing decisions. Yet, 
Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), and Harris and Raviv 
(1991) agreed on the fact that, while progress has been made from the initial 
work of Modigliani and Miller in 1958, the empirical work was lagging behind and 
doing very little to identify empirical findings of capital structure in practice. 
While theoretical work had identified a large number of potential determinants of 
capital structure, empirical studies have not frequently considered various 
contexts outside the G-7 countries.  
In recent years, empirical studies on capital structure determinants have 
been largely extended to different developed and developing countries including 
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Holland (Chen, Lensink, & Sterken, 1998), Korea (Kim, Heshmati, & Aoun, 2006), 
Japan (Cortez & Sunanto, 2012), Czech Republic (Bauer, 2004), and Egypt 
(Eldomiaty, 2007). They identified both similarities and discrepancies in what 
factors influence firm financing decisions across different contexts. 
As an emerging market in the Southeast Asia, Vietnam’s economy 
differentiates itself with unique features. Having transformed from a highly 
centralized planned economy to a socialist-oriented market economy through the 
Doi Moi economic reforms policy initiated during the 1980s, Vietnam has 
achieved a combined effect of economic reforms. These changes include 
enhancing international economic integration, joining the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) by the end of 2006, and going through a rapid phase of 
economic development in terms of investment, trade, and financial system. 
Vietnam successfully implemented economic restructuring programs, especially 
the successful equitization process of state-owned companies. The participation 
in the WTO in the end of 2006 and blooming capital markets – mainly the stock 
market – have increased the capital needs of Vietnamese firms, while at the same 
time providing them with a variety of fund raising options in order to meet capital 
requirements. However, due to a newly established and small-sized stock market, 
firms have been relying on bank credit as their main funding source. Yet credit 
institutions face tougher competition, low liquidity and high level of bad debt and 
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information asymmetry while the bond market is still highly underdeveloped. The 
financial crisis in 2008 has negatively affected the capital market in Vietnam, by 
contributing to high inflation, tightening credit by credit institutions, and 
changing regulatory laws regarding taxes. This has created many difficulties for 
firms and has increased bankruptcies. Since the end of 2013, the capital market 
has been recovering, as indicated by lowered inflation, reduced interest rates, 
and a more active stock and bond market. 
While understanding the factors influencing the financing decision of 
Vietnamese firms is highly important, there have been only a few well-known 
published studies on the topic of capital structure determinants of listed firms. 
These included a study by Anh and Yen (2014), focusing only on firms on the Ho 
Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE), and Phi Anh (2010) and Chi (2013), who 
conducted a study on a broad set of Vietnamese listed firms. Although these 
studies have contributed to our understanding of capital structure in Vietnam, 
they are still in disagreement over the basic determinants of capital structure, 
and possess certain limitations such as lack of factors, limited time horizon, and 
small sample size.  
More effort needs to be made to explore the capital structure decisions of 
Vietnamese firms in order to provide a more accurate and thorough analysis for 
the use of researchers and practitioners. This study intends to contribute to the 
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literature on this subject by examining the determinants of firm capital structure 
in Vietnam – one of the notable developing markets.  
This paper is considerably different from other previous capital structure 
studies of Vietnamese firms. Firstly, this study covers a much larger set of 
potential capital structure determinants, including those that have never or 
hardly ever been incorporated in previous studies. For example, business risk, 
uniqueness of assets, non-debt tax shields, industry classifications, stock market 
conditions, and debt market conditions, which are discussed in detail in Chapter 
2. Secondly, in contrast to previous studies, this study uses four different leverage 
measures instead of only one, and determines factors that affect each, making for 
a significantly more comprehensive analysis. Thirdly, this study uses a larger data 
set in a longer time horizon, increasing the number of observations, compared to 
the majority of previous studies. The main data set covers a five-year period; 
however, some data has been collected over a seven year period for the purpose 
of calculating the values of variables. The sample size is relatively large and 
includes firms from both stock exchanges in Vietnam: Hanoi Stock Exchange and 
Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange. Finally, the methodology used for the panel data 
has been improved upon and updated with a thorough analysis of different 
models and tests.  
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C. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
This study sets out with three purposes: 1) to explore the theoretical 
framework of capital structures including the most advocated theories that 
explain capital structure decisions of firms, 2) to determine the relationship 
between leverage and specific potential factors based on theoretical and 
empirical findings, and identify the most reliable empirical determinants of the 
capital structure for Vietnamese listed firms, 3) to build core leverage models that 
show the relationship between leverage and the influential factors, and help to 
estimate the level of debt financing of firms in Vietnam.  
D. JUSTIFICATION FOR STUDY 
This study was conducted bearing in mind the need for more research on 
both empirical capital structure in emerging or developing markets in general, 
and Vietnam in particular. The financing activities of firms in developing markets 
are subjected to less developed and less efficient capital markets than that of 
firms in developed countries. Also, the level of information transparency is low in 
such markets; thus, information asymmetry affects the financing decisions of 
firms differently from developed markets.  
Due to incomplete capital markets, companies in emerging/developing 
markets are not able to follow the clear capital structure approaches that have 
been explained by widely-known theories. Therefore, examining the 
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determinants of capital structure in such countries as Vietnam is highly important 
in an attempt to understand the capital structure behaviors of firms and factors 
influencing capital structure decisions in emerging/developing markets and to 
compare these with those of developed markets. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This paper is composed of five chapters:  
1) Chapter 1 (Introduction) is an introduction to the study, including a brief 
background, statement of the problem, purpose and justification of the 
study. 
2) Chapter 2 (Literature Review) provides a review of current theoretical and 
empirical research that has been conducted on the topic of capital 
structure and its determinants. 
3) Chapter 3 (Research Methodology) presents the descriptions of variables 
and their measurement studied in this paper and the methodology of 
sampling and data analysis. 
4) Chapter 4 (Results of the study) provides the main analysis including 
descriptive analysis, correlation matrix, and regression analysis, and how it 
leads to the main findings. 
5) Chapter 5 (Summary of the study) summarizes the main points of the study 
and presents the limitations and ideas for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. THEORETICAL FINDINGS 
In their review paper, Harris and Raviv (1991) synthesized literature that 
proposed theories on the determination of capital structure. They concluded that 
theoretical works have identified a large number of potential capital structure 
determinants. They also pointed out that, although these findings rest on a small 
number of “general principles”, they vary significantly in the predictions of how 
firms make financing decisions. Myers (2001, p. 82) asserted that “There is no 
universal theory of the debt-equity choice, and no reason to expect one. There 
are several useful conditional theories, however.” and that “Each emphasizes 
certain costs and benefits of alternative financing strategies” (p. 99). With respect 
to the recognition of the existence of an optimal capital structure, theories can be 
grouped in two categories; the first category includes trade-off theory, agency 
theory, and free cash flow theory, which predict that there is an optimal level of 
debt for each firm. The second category includes pecking order theory and equity 
market timing theory, which argue against the existence of an optimal capital 
structure.  
Trade-off theory, agency theory, and free cash flow theory 
Capital structure theories have been largely based on trade-off models to 
predict an optimal debt-equity choice that happens as a result of trade-offs 
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between benefits and costs of borrowing. Firstly, Myers (1984) and Bradley, 
Jarrell, and Kim (1984) discussed the trade-off between tax advantage provided 
by debt, measured by the debt tax shields or tax saving, and the cost of using 
debt, measured by the financial distress, or the bankruptcy costs. According to 
Myers (1984), a firm obtains its optimal capital structure at the debt ratio where 
the debt tax shield balances the financial distress costs. This theory leads to the 
qualitative prediction that firms with lower tax advantages or higher bankruptcy 
costs should use less debt financing. Secondly, the agency theory, as discussed in 
the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977), focuses on 
the trade-off between agency costs – including agency cost of equity arising from 
the relation between stockholders and managers and agency cost of debt arising 
from the relation between stockholders and debtholders. The optimal capital 
structure is the debt-equity level at which the firm achieves the lowest total 
agency cost. Thirdly, the free cash flow theory, also related to agency theory, 
focuses on the trade-off between the impact of debt financing on mitigating 
agency problems via cutting managerial discretion on available free cash flows 
(Jensen, 1986) and the cost of financial distress. In firms that generate substantial 
free cash flow, debt forces managers to effectively meet their promise to pay out 
future cash flows rather than invest in unprofitable projects or organizational 
inefficiencies, and can be an effective substitute for dividends (Jensen, 1986).  
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Pecking order theory and market timing theory 
The pecking order model was outlined by Myers and Majluf (1984) and 
Myers (1984). Based on the observed behaviour of firms, they predict the 
tendency of firms to prefer internal funding sources to external sources, and, 
when it becomes necessary for firms to seek external financing, to prefer debt 
over equity. Myers and Majluf (1984) asserted that information asymmetry 
affects financing choices between internal and external, debt and equity choice. 
Based on their knowledge of information about the firm that outsiders are not 
privy to, managers make external financing decisions in reflection of what they 
believe to be the true value of the firm. This action sends signals to the market – 
for example, issuing new equity signals that the stock is overvalued, while using 
more debt is a positive signal that the firm is confident about its future prospects. 
According to the pecking order theory, changes in leverage are determined by the 
need for external funds, not by optimal capital structure decisions. Thus, it 
concludes that there is no well-defined target debt ratio.    
The market timing theory, according to Baker and Wurgler (2002), is about 
the timing at which firms implement actions that maximize stock value based on 
market conditions at different points in time (i.e. issuing equity or debt). Baker 
and Wurgler (2002, p. 2) stated that “market timing has large, persistent effects 
on capital structures”, specifically “low leverage firms are those that raised funds 
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when their market valuations were high”, “while high leverage firms are those 
that raised funds when their market valuations were low.” Whether or not funds 
are raised is dependent on the needs of the firm, but strongly relates to the debt 
and equity market condition; thus, there is no well-defined optimal capital 
structure.  
B. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Empirical testing of the determinants of capital structure has been 
conducted with a focus on firms in developed countries, especially the United 
States. The standout studies include Bradley et al. (1984), based on a sample of 
851 firms in 20 years from 1962 to 1981, Titman and Wessels (1988), based on 
469 firms from 1976 to 1982, Long and Malitz (1985), on a set of 545 firms from 
1978 to 1980, and Frank and Goyal (2009), a study over a 50 year time horizon 
from 1950 to 2003.  
Some key findings on U.S. firms include those provided by Titman and 
Wessels (1988) who analyzed a broad set of capital structure theories and 
different measures of debt, including short-term, long-term, and convertible debt 
rather than an aggregate measure of total debt. Their results showed that 
uniqueness, transaction costs, and firm sizes are influential factors, while non-
debt tax shields, volatility, collateral value, and future growth are not related to 
leverage. Expanding on such findings, Frank and Goyal (2009) considered a larger 
18 
 
set of factors with the potential to affect capital structure decision, including 
profitability, firm size, growth, industry conditions, nature of assets, taxes, risk, 
supply-side factors, stock market conditions, debt market conditions, and 
macroeconomic conditions. The six identified reliable factors to market-based 
leverage are industry conditions (industry median leverage), growth (market to 
book ratio), nature of assets (tangibility), profitability (profit), firm size (book 
value of assets), and debt market conditions (inflation).  
With regard to other major industrialized countries, Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) conducted a study on public firms in G7 countries. Toy, Stonehill, 
Remmers, and Beekhuisen (1974) investigated the determinants of capital 
structure across France, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United States, 
representing one of the earliest efforts to conduct a cross-country study. Chen, et 
al. (1998) conducted an investigation of how the main theories on capital 
structure can explain capital structure choices of Dutch firms and identified the 
determining factors. In Canada, Nunkoo and Boateng (2010) studied empirical 
determinants of capital structure of Canadian firms listed on the Toronto stock 
exchange during the period from 1996 to 2004. The results showed a positive and 
significant impact of profitability and tangibility, and a negative influence of 
growth opportunities and size on the leverage of Canadian firms. 
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Empirical work also extends to Holland (Chen et al., 1998), China (Huang & 
Song, 2002), Korea (Kim et al., 2006), Japan (Cortez & Sunanto, 2012), Czech 
Republic (Bauer, 2004), and Egypt (Eldomiaty, 2007). Cross-country research 
continues to be performed, for example, a comparison of capital structure 
determinants between the United States and the Republic of Korea is made in a 
study by Kim and Berger (2008).  
In Vietnam, there have been few credible published studies on the topic of 
capital structure determinants. The most notable work was conducted by Chi 
(2013), on a sample consisting of 178 non-financial companies listed on the Ho 
Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) and Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) from 2007 to 
2010. The study used the Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) method for factor 
selection and regression with pooling model on a sample consisting of 178 non-
financial companies listed on HOSE and HNX from 2007 to 2010. They found that 
there are six factors affecting the capital structure decisions of firms, including 
macroeconomics factors (tax rate, inflation), internal factors (market to book 
ratio, profitability), and industry factors (industry leverage), and behavior of 
managers. Chi (2013) also concluded that there is strong evidence suggesting that 
pecking order theory influences capital structure decisions, and no evidence 
found for the trade-off theory.  
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Phi Anh (2010) tested the determinants of capital structure and its effect 
on financial performance, using 428 listed companies on Vietnamese stock 
exchanges, the largest sample size in Vietnam’s capital structure literature. This 
paper employed a different technique – path analysis – and pointed out that 
profitability, business risk, asset structure, and firm size are factors influencing a 
firm’s debt ratio. This study only agrees with Chi (2013) regarding the inverse 
relationship between profitability and leverage.  
In a more recent study, Anh and Yen (2014) identified the factors affecting 
capital structure decision of firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange 
(HOSE), based on 180 non-financial companies. Based on the fixed effect 
estimation method, the study pointed out three main determinants of leverage, 
including firm size, profitability, and taxes. Despite the fact that this study was 
conducted on only HOSE, whereas Chi (2013) studied both HOSE and HNX, both 
papers conclude that profitability and taxes have an influence on leverage; 
however, they disagree over the direction of the relationship. Chi (2013) asserted 
that return on assets, as a proxy for profitability, has a negative relationship with 
leverage consistent with the pecking order theory, and tax rate has a positive 
relationship with leverage, following the trade-off theory. Meanwhile, Anh and 
Yen (2014) found a positive correlation between profitability and financial 
leverage and a negative correlation between taxes and financial leverage. Similar 
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to the results presented by Phi Anh (2010), the findings of Anh and Yen (2014) 
show the positive influence of profitability and firm size on leverage. 
In addition, Okuda and Nhung (2012) conducted research on capital 
structure and investment behavior on a sample of 299 non-financial companies 
listed on the HOSE and HNX for two continuous years (2008 and 2009). The 
findings regarding capital structure determinants include: 1) Standard corporate 
financing theories may be suitable to explain the capital structure of listed 
companies in Vietnam; 2) There are differences between the determinants of 
long-term fund-raising and the determinants of short-term fund-raising, in which 
profitability is important for short term financing decisions while tangibility of 
assets determines long term financing decisions; 3) State-controlled firms have an 
advantage in reducing agency costs, thus, they tend to borrow more than non-
state-owned firms; 4) Companies on HOSE are less dependent on borrowed funds 
than those on HNX. Okuda and Nhung (2012) suggested that state ownership and 
the market at which the stock is listed might affect firm financing decisions.  
In earlier research, Nguyen and Ramanchandran (2006) attempted to 
identify the determinants influencing the capital structure of small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) in Vietnam, using a stratified random sample of 558 
SMEs over the period 1998-2001, of which 176 are state-owned and 382 are 
private. This research points out that the capital structure of SMEs in Vietnam is 
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positively related to growth, business risk, firm size, networking, and relationships 
with banks – but negatively related to Tangibility. Profitability seems to have no 
significant impact on the capital structure of Vietnamese SMEs.  
Overall, despite that empirical work on capital structure in Vietnam has 
pointed out some of the critical determinants of the capital structure of firms, it 
has not been sufficient to provide the most conclusive findings. This is true for a 
number of reasons: 1) there is a lack of detailed literature review on theoretical 
and empirical capital structure studies; 2) there are notable limitations in the 
sampled data, including a short time horizon and not always covering firms on 
both stock exchanges; 3) there is inconsistency in financial leverage measures and 
factor measures; 4) there are a small number of determinants being studied, (i.e. 
many factors that were pointed out by theory and international empirical 
research still have not been included), 5) there is limited access to data such as 
data on non-listed firms and data on corporate governance, and 6) there is 
insufficient estimation of the core leverage model. 
This study deals with such limitations by the following measures: 1) 
providing a more complete review of capital structure literature with both 
theoretical and empirical findings from international and Vietnamese studies; 2) 
expanding the studied time period to five years – from 2009 to 2013 – and using 
data collected for firms in both stock exchanges, making it possible for a larger 
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number of observations; 3) incorporating a larger set of potential capital 
structure determinants and using a number of different leverage measures that 
bring more perspectives on the capital structure behaviors of firms; 4) delivering 
the core leverage factors in core leverage models that influence each leverage 
measure separately.  
C. DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
The survey done by Harris and Raviv (1991) presented the main findings of 
nine studies on firm and industry characteristics that affect capital structure. 
These studies are: Bradley et al. (1984), Chaplinsky and Nichaus (1990), Friend 
and Hasbrouck (1988), Friend and Lang (1988), Gonedes, Lang, and Chikaonda 
(1988), Long and Malitz (1985), Kester (1986), Kim and Sorensen (1986), Marsh 
(1982), and Titman and Wessels (1988). Harris and Raviv (1991) pointed out that 
these studies generally agree on following determinants of capital structure: 
volatility (–/+), bankruptcy probability (–), fixed assets (+), non-debt tax shields 
(+/–), advertising (–), R&D expenditures (–), profitability (–/+), growth 
opportunities (–/+), size (–/+), free cash flow (–), and uniqueness of product (–). 1 
Despite taking the above factors into their consideration, Frank and Goyal (2009) 
extracted a longer list of capital structure determinants in which additional 
factors are industry leverage, industry classification, tangibility of assets, taxes, 
                                                   
1 The sign (+) or (–) shows the direction of the relationship (direct/positive or inverse/negative) 
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debt rating, stock market condition, debt market condition, and macroeconomic 
condition.  
Based on the existing literature and data availability, the following 
potential determinants of capital structure are analysed in this study. 
1. Business risk 
Volatility of earnings or cash flows is the measure of risk that a firm faces, 
especially business risk. Titman and Wessels (1988, p. 6) confirmed in their study 
that “many authors have also suggested that a firm’s optimal debt level is a 
decreasing function of the volatility of earnings”. A similar argument is presented 
by Frank and Goyal (2009). More risky cash flows resulting from cyclicality or 
seasonality of business lines will reduce the benefits of tax shields; thus, trade-off 
theory would support a negative relation between volatility and leverage. Also, 
firms with volatile cash flows will also want to avoid making large fixed 
commitments for debt holders. The higher expected costs of financial distress 
make it less appealing to have high leverage, according to trade-off theory. 
On the other hand, Frank and Goyal (2009) mentioned that firms with high 
volatility in earnings can be regarded in the financial markets as having poor 
management or problems in business lines, resulting in volatile stock prices. With 
higher information asymmetry associated with riskier firms, the pecking order 
theory would suggest that these firms have higher leverage. 
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Empirical studies reported conflicting results. While some authors (Bauer, 
2004; Phi Anh, 2010) pointed out a negative relationship between volatility and 
leverage, other authors (Huang & Song, 2002; Nguyen & Ramachandran, 2006) 
showed a positive impact. Meanwhile, Rajan and Zingales (1995) did not take this 
factor into account, and Titman and Wessels (1988) did not provide any 
significant results for the volatility factor. Besides Phi Anh (2010) and Nguyen and 
Ramachandran (2006), no other authors in Vietnam have included volatility in 
their study of capital structure. 
2. Profitability 
From the theoretical viewpoint, profitability has been found to have 
inconsistent influences on financial leverage. Trade-off theory and free cash flow 
theory predict a positive relationship between profitability and leverage. 
According to the trade-off theory, profitable firms benefit more from interest tax 
shields and face lower expected costs of financial distress, so these firms are 
likely to use more debt (Myers, 1984; Bradley et al., 1984).  
In addition, Jensen (1986) asserted that managers with substantial free 
cash flow tend to make weak promises to pay dividends and may waste cash or 
spend it on low-return projects. According to Jensen (1986, p. 325), using debt 
enables managers to “effectively bond their promise to pay out future cash 
flows”, and thus reduces conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
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managers. The higher the profitability a firm may have, the larger the free cash 
flow it generates, making the conflicts more severe. Therefore, the use of debt is 
more valuable for profitable firms in controlling agency conflicts. For the above 
reasons, the free cash flow and agency theories suggest a positive relationship 
between profitability and leverage.  
On the other hand, Myers and Majluf (1984) predicted a negative 
relationship between profitability and leverage based on the pecking order 
theory. Profitable firms are likely to accumulate more retained earnings as a 
source of internal funds, and will therefore need less debt overtime.  
Empirical studies also do not totally agree on one particular conclusion. 
The majority of them, however, observed an inverse relationship between 
profitability and leverage, for example Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), and Frank and Goyal (2009) for U.S. firms, Huang and Song (2002) 
for Chinese firms, Bauer (2004) for Czech firms, Bauer (2004) for Visegrad firms, 
Cortez and Susanto (2012) for Japanese firms, and Kim et al. (2006) for Korean 
firms. In contrast, some authors found a positive relation between profitability 
and leverage, for example, Nunkoo and Boateng (2010) for Canadian firm. The 
literature also indicates conflicted findings on how profitability influences the use 
of debt with Vietnamese listed firms.  While Chi (2013) and Phi Anh (2010) 
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pointed out an inverse relationship, Anh and Yen (2014) identified a positive 
relationship.  
3. Firm Size 
Firm size has an influence on capital structure, regardless of the fact that 
the relationship remains unclear according to theoretical predictions. Larger and 
older firms are more likely to be financially and operationally stronger, so these 
firms are less likely to go bankrupt (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Mature firms are also 
able to issue debt at lower costs due to their better reputation in the financial 
market. These reasons explain why larger firms often take on more debt than 
smaller firms, according to trade-off theory.  
By contrast, the pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984) argues that 
large firms are likely to disclose more information to the public or outside 
investors, and are better known than small firms, thus, having less asymmetric 
information. Equity financing will therefore be more favorable compared to debt, 
as the negative signal of issuing new shares is limited due to a higher level of 
information transparency for larger firms. Small firms may pay higher transaction 
costs than large firms to issue new shares, thus, are more likely to prefer debt 
(Titman & Wessels, 1988). Also, the pecking order theory suggests a negative 
relationship between firm size and leverage, seeing as older firms often build 
more retained earnings as a source of internal equity financing. 
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Some empirical studies confirm a positive relationship between firm size 
and leverage, including Rajan and Zingales (1995), Huang and Song (2002), Bauer 
(2004), Frank and Goyal (2009), and, especially, Phi Anh (2010) and Anh and Yen 
(2014) for Vietnamese firms. Meanwhile, other studies find a negative 
relationship between firm size and leverage, including Titman and Wessels (1988) 
and Nunkoo and Boateng (2010). Chi (2013) found no evidence of the influence of 
size on leverage for Vietnamese firms. 
4. Growth opportunities 
Theories provide contrasting predictions on the relationship between 
growth opportunities and debt ratio. First, according to Myers and Majluf (1984), 
the pecking order theory implies a positive relationship between expected 
growth and leverage because firms with higher growth opportunities need more 
funds to finance their projects. When internal financing cannot meet capital 
needs, these firms will need more external financing, particularly debt, according 
to the order of preference. Second, Smith and Watts (1992) proposed the 
signalling hypothesis which indicates that firms with more growth opportunities 
face greater information asymmetry; thus, these firms should be highly levered in 
order to signal their quality to the market. 
On the other hand, Myers (1977) argued that firms having higher growth 
options often bear higher financial distress costs in case of bankruptcy, have 
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lower free cash flow problems, and incur severe debt-related agency problems. 
Smith and Watts (1992) proposed a counter argument to the signalling 
hypothesis. They argued that managers might not undertake positive net present 
value projects because they will lose payoffs to debt holders who hold senior 
claim on the cash flows. This leads to underinvestment problems, first recognized 
by Myers (1977). It can be inferred that, to control this problem and avoid losing 
shareholders’ value, firms may find it preferable to finance growth opportunities 
with equity rather than debt. Hence, the larger the portion of firm value 
represented by growth opportunities, the lower the assets-in-place – and thus, 
the lower the level of debt. In addition, firms with better growth prospects often 
have less free cash flow. Such firms will not need to choose a higher level of debt 
as firms with more free cash flow often do in order to commit to paying out 
excess cash. Trade-off theory, agency theory, and free cash flow theory therefore 
suggest that the level of debt used by a firm is inversely related to its growth 
opportunities. 
In the same manner, empirical findings provide two opposite directions in 
the relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), Titman and Wessels (1988), Bauer (2004), Frank and Goyal (2009), 
Nunkoo and Boateng (2010), and Chi (2013) confirmed that growth has a negative 
on leverage; while Huang and Song (2002) identified a positive relationship 
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between growth and leverage. As far as Vietnamese firms are concerned, Chi 
(2013) indicated that growth opportunities, measured by book to market ratio, is 
a capital structure determinant. However, Anh and Yen (2014) and Phi Anh (2010) 
found no evidence to support such relationship.  
5. Tangibility 
According to Bradley et al. (1984), firms that invest heavily in tangible 
assets can use debt at a lower borrowing cost because these firms can use the 
tangible assets as collaterals. Outsiders find it easier to value tangible assets such 
as property, plant, and equipment than intangibles such as goodwill. Also, Smith 
and Warner (1979) and Long and Malitz (1985) discussed the assets substitution 
problem by pointing out that high tangible asset investment will mitigate asset 
substitution problems as it is more difficult for shareholders to exchange the 
firms’ low-risk assets than high-risk ones in order to gain value from debt-holders. 
Therefore, with lower expected costs of financial distress and fewer debt-related 
agency problems, the tangibility of the firms’ assets and firm leverage are likely to 
have a positive relationship. On the other hand, Bradley et al. (1984) and Long 
and Malitz (1985) argued that firms making large discretionary expenditures such 
as SG&A expenses and R&D expenses often possess more intangible assets, and, 
thus, are less levered.  
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Harris and Raviv (1991) claimed that, according to the pecking order 
theory, firms with few tangible assets would have greater asymmetric 
information problems; thus, such firms will tend to accumulate more debt over 
time and become highly levered. Issuing equity will be a better choice for firms 
with large tangible assets because of low information asymmetry. This suggests a 
negative relationship between tangibility and leverage.  
Empirical research has reported conflicting results. A positive relationship 
between tangibility and leverage is found in some studies such as Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), Frank and Goyal (2009), Huang and Song (2002), Cortez and 
Susanto (2012), Nunkoo and Boateng (2010), and Okuda and Nhung (2012) for 
Vietnamese firms. On the other hand, a negative relationship is observed in 
studies such as Bauer (2004), and Nguyen and Ramachandran (2006) for 
Vietnamese firms. There is no evidence of any relationship reported by Titman 
and Wessels (1988), Chi (2013), Anh and Yen (2014), and Phi Anh (2010) in 
Vietnam. 
6. Uniqueness 
Theory predicts that uniqueness is negatively related to leverage. Titman 
(1984) argued that firms that operate in a unique market and produce unique 
goods and services often make specialized capital expenditures and labor 
investments with high R&D and large SG&A expenses. These firms face higher 
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financial distress costs because it is harder to liquidate inventory, machines, and 
other assets, making a lower expected value recoverable by a lender in case of 
bankruptcy. Therefore these firms have lower debt capacity.   
Empirical work has found little evidence of the relationship between 
uniqueness and leverage, except for Titman and Wessels (1988) who reported an 
inverse relationship between uniqueness and debt ratio. Remarkably, studies on 
Vietnamese firms have not taken this factor into account as a potential capital 
structure determinant.  
7. Taxes and non-debt tax shields 
The trade-off theory predicts higher leverage when a firm is forced to pay 
higher taxes on its earnings. The higher the taxes firms pay, the higher the value 
of debt tax shields firms can gain, as suggested by Myers (1984). Furthermore, 
non-debt tax shields such as accounting depreciation, depletion allowances, and 
investment tax credits have been found to have a negative influence on leverage 
because they act as substitutes for the benefit of debt financing coming from 
interest tax shields (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980).  
Empirical research has shown support for the above predictions regarding 
the relationship between taxes and leverage, although it is not one of the most 
popular factors. Bauer (2004) and Chi (2013) found that taxes have a positive 
influence on the use of debt, yet, the impact of taxes does not always hold. For 
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example, Anh and Yen (2014) identified a negative relationship that can be seen 
by the observation that firms in countries without corporate taxes are still using 
debt financing.  
Non-debt tax shields, often relating to depreciation and other operating 
expenses, are observed in the empirical work of Bauer (2004), Huang and Song 
(2002), and Cortez and Susanto (2012) to have a negative relationship with 
leverage. This is consistent with what theory suggests. 
8. Industry Condition 
Several studies confirm the existence of a link between industry leverage 
and firm leverage. Bradley et al. (1984, p. 858) found that “the permanent or 
average firm leverage ratios are strongly related to industry classification” and 
this relationship remained true even after excluding regulated firms. Harris and 
Raviv (1995, p. 333) also found this relationship as “the most basic stylized facts 
concerning industry characteristics and capital structure”. Moreover, their study 
supported the general conclusion of previous studies that drugs, instruments, 
electronics, and food are industries with consistently low leverage, while paper, 
textile, mill products, steel, airlines, and cement are those with consistently high 
leverage. This relationship can be explained by the assertion that firms operating 
within an industry are affected by similar industry factors in their leverage 
decisions, such as business risk, regulation, market forces, and investment 
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opportunities. Another reason for this relationship is that many firms have the 
tendency to choose the industry median leverage as a proxy for their target 
capital structure or adjust their capital structure according to the industry 
average.  
Empirical studies such as Long and Malitz (1985), Frank and Goyal (2009), 
Bauer (2004) also observed this relationship. One exception is Chi (2013), who 
found a statistically significant relationship between industry leverage and firm 
leverage. Studies of Vietnamese firms have not included industry classifications. 
9. Stock Market Condition 
According to the market timing hypothesis, as discussed by Baker and 
Wurgler (2002), managers are aware of equity market timing in financing 
decisions. Baker and Wurgler (2002, p. 1) stated that “current capital structure is 
strongly related to historical market values” in the way that “firms are more likely 
to issue equity when their market values are high, relative to book and past 
market values, and to repurchase equity when their market values are low.” This 
suggests a negative relationship between stock return and leverage. 
On an empirical note, Graham and Harvey (2001) pointed out that 
managers admitted to attempting to capture the right timing with the stock 
market and that this serves as one of the most important considerations in 
financial decision-making. Two thirds of managers believed that whether a firm 
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issues more or repurchases its stocks depends on whether the stock is 
undervalued or overvalued. Also, Welch (2004) discovered that U.S. firms do not 
have actions to respond to the effects of stock price changes on their capital 
structure, which makes debt-equity ratios move closely with fluctuations in stock 
prices. Thus, roughly 40% of the changes in debt ratio can be explained by stock 
returns over the five-year horizons (Welch, 2004). It is suggested that market 
return is among important factors affecting the capital structure of listed firms. 
Despite being identified as an important factor deciding the timing of 
equity issues in many studies, stock market condition is not frequently used in 
empirical studies on the determinants of capital structure (including Vietnamese 
studies that have not mentioned stock market condition). Frank and Goyal (2009) 
contended that such a factor is not within the traditional scope of research.  
10. Debt market condition 
Kaya (2013, p. 114) summarized that “both equity market timing and debt 
market timing focus on the same question: do firms time their financing activities 
in order to reduce their cost of capital?” It has been observed that managers are 
aware of debt market timing in financing decision-making by their timing of 
financing activities in order to reduce the cost of capital. Empirical studies found 
that firms borrow more in the periods of relatively low interest rates due to the 
lower cost of borrowing (Taggart, 1977; Marsh, 1982; Barry, Mann, Mihov, & 
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Rodriguez, 2008). For this reason, it is predicted that interest rate and leverage 
have an inverse relationship.  
On the other hand, it can be implied from the trade-off theory that 
increasing interest rates will make tax shields more valuable by providing more 
debt tax shields to firms. This supports a positive relationship between interest 
rate and leverage. 
11.    Macroeconomic Conditions 
In terms of the tax advantage mentioned in the trade-off theory, inflation 
affects the real values of tax savings on debt. When inflation is high, the tax 
advantage is more valuable (Taggart, 1985). Thus, the trade-off theory suggests a 
positive relationship between leverage and expected inflation. Also, market 
timing theory predicts that high inflation leads to higher leverage because 
inflation leads to a lower real cost of debt – this pushes the demand for corporate 
bond issuance during the inflationary periods.  
With respect to empirical findings on the impact of inflation on leverage, 
Frank and Goyal (2009) reported a positive impact for U.S. companies, while Chi 
(2013) demonstrated the negative impact of inflation on leverage for Vietnamese 
firms. Other than Chi (2013), no studies have researched the impact of inflation 




CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
Measures of capital structure  
A firm can issue different types of securities in its financing mix, including 
short-term debt, long-term debt, convertible debt, preferred stock, and common 
stock. The term “leverage” used in capital structure research refers to financial 
leverage, not operating leverage or total leverage. When a company has no debt 
in its capital structure, it is said to be “unlevered”; when it has debt, the company 
is “levered” or leveraged.  
Rajan and Zingales (1995) mentioned that the extent of leverage and the 
relevant measure of leverage depends on each research objective, which has 
created a number of different measures of financial leverage and a long held 
discussion surrounding how leverage should be measured. When studying 
problems with agency, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) were 
concerned about how the firm has been financed and the relative claims on firm 
value held by equity and debt – thus using the stock of total debt relative to firm 
value.  Titman and Wessels (1988) separated short-term debt and convertible 
debt in an attempt to find the independent attributes that vary with debt 
maturity features. They used six measure of capital structure by taking long-term, 
short-term, and convertible debt divided by market or book values of equity. 
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Rajan and Zingales (1995) asserted that the broadest definition of leverage 
(the ratio of total liabilities to total assets) fails to indicate whether the firm is at 
risk of default in the near future, or whether it provides a higher value than the 
real leverage – since total liabilities include items such as accounts payable which 
arise from transaction purposes, not financing purposes. The ratio of debt (as the 
sum of short-term and long-term debts) to total assets does not address the fact 
that current assets include those that can be offset by specific non-debt liabilities. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) recommended that the best measures of leverage 
should be based only on debt and equity capital that firms raise for financing 
purposes. 
Frank and Goyal (2009) used four leverage measures, based on whether 
they are derived from market value of equity or book value of equity, and if total 
debt or only long-term debt is considered. These measures were taken by 
dividing total debt or long-term debt by market value of assets or book value of 
total assets. However, these measures used total assets, therefore they do not 
address the above fact that Rajan and Zingales (1995) have mentioned.  
To come to a conclusion on the best leverage measures, this study follows 
Rajan and Zingales (1995). After reviewing various leverage measures used in 
previous research, Rajan and Zingales (1995, p. 1429) concluded that “the effects 
of past financing decisions is probably best represented by the ratio of total debt 
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to capital (defined as total debt plus equity).” Hence, the most relevant 
definitions of leverage to use in this study include the ratios of total debt to 
capital – either in book value or market value – and the ratios of long-term debt 
to capital – either in book value and market value. These measures are identified 
below. 
Table 1: Measures of leverage 
Denotation Dependent Variable Calculation 
TDM 
Total Debt to Market Value  
of Capital Ratio 
= Total debt2 /  
(Total Debt + MV of Equity3) 
TDC 
Total Debt to Book Value  
of Capital Ratio 
= Total debt /  
(Total Debt + BV of Equity4) 
LDM 
Long-term Debt to Market Value 
of Capital Ratio 
= Long-term debt /  
(Total Debt + MV of Equity) 
LDC 
Long-term Debt to Book Value  
of Capital Ratio 
= Long-term debt /  
(Total Debt + BV of Equity) 
 
Measures of capital structure determinants 
A complete set of the potential determinants of capital structure, the 
proxies to measure them, and the predicted effects on leverage are presented in 
Tables 2 and Table 3 below.  
 
                                                   
2 Total debt includes Short-term debt in Current Liabilities, Current portion of long-term debt in Current 
Liabilities, and Long-term debt in Long-term Liabilities, all at book value, extracted directly from Balance 
Sheet. 
3 MV of Equity (denoting market value of equity) equals the adjusted closing price multiplies by the 
number of shares outstanding.  




Table 2: Measures of capital structures determinants  
Proxy Factors Calculation 
ROA5 Profitability EBIT (1-Tc) / Average Total Assets6; 
Average Total Assets = (Total Assets Year End N-1 + 
Total Assets Year End N)/2  





Market Value of Assets/ Book Value of Assets; 
Market Value of Assets = Market Value of Equity +  
Book Value of Liabilities 
CAPEX8 Growth 
opportunities 
Capital Expenditure / Total Assets 
TANG9 Tangibility Net Property, Plant, and Equipment / Total Assets 
SGA10 Uniqueness Selling, General & Administration Expense / Net Sales 
TAX11 Average tax rate Tax Expenses / Earning Before Taxes; 
EBT12 = Tax Expenses + Net Income 
DEPR13 Non-debt tax 
shields 
Depreciation Expense / Total Assets 
RISK Business risk Three-year rolling Standard Deviation of ROA; 
RISKn = Standard Deviation of ROA in year n-1, n, n+1 
INDLEV14 Industry mean 
leverage 
Industry average debt to capital ratio of eighteen 
different non-financial industries15 
                                                   
5 ROA denotes Return on Assets. 
6 EBIT means Earnings before Interest and Taxes. 
7 GROWTH denotes Market to Book value of Assets. 
8 CAPEX denotes Capital Expenditure. 
9 TANG denotes tangibility as measured by Net Property, Plant, and Equipment, which equals Property, 
Plant, and Equipment (PPE) deducting Accumulated depreciation on PPE. 
10 SGA denotes Selling, General & Administration Expenses. 
11 TAX represents average tax rate on the accounting income before taxes of firms. 
12 EBT means Earnings before Taxes. 
13 DEPR denotes depreciation. Depreciation is not the only source of non-debt tax shields. All operating 
expenses are non-debt tax shield sources. However, depreciation is used as a proxy in this study. 
14 INDLEV stands for industry mean leverage. 
15 Industry mean leverages are extracted from Cophieu68 database. 
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Proxy Factors Calculation 
INDCL16 Industry 
classification 




= 1 if the firm belongs to Petroleum, and Energy - 
Electricity – Gas industries; 0 = otherwise 
INDCL2 Industry 
classification 




= 1 if the firm belongs to Construction, Construction 
Materials, and Real Estate industries; 0 = otherwise 
INDCL4 Industry 
classification 
= 1 if the firm belongs to Manufacturing, Steel, and 
Plastics and Packaging industries; 0 = otherwise 
INDCL5 Industry 
classification 
= 1 if the firm belongs to Service – Tourism and 
Commerce industries 
STOCKMRT17 Stock market 
return 
Average return of VN-Index18 Yearly Return and HNX-
Index19 Yearly Return; Yearly Return N =  
(Return Year N – Return Year N-1)/Return Year N-1 
LENDRT20 Average lending 
rate 
Yearly average lending rate by Vietnam’s credit 
institutions in the market  
INFLATION Inflation rate Yearly inflation rate of Vietnamese economy 
With respect to the dummy variable INDCL, industries that have their 
economic activities and operations highly regulated by a number of effective laws 
and regulations enacted by legislative bodies, such as the National Assembly of 
Vietnam, are classified as regulated industries. Those that are not as strictly 
                                                   
16 INDCL means industry classification. 
17 STOCKMRT denotes stock market return on Vietnam stock market. 
18 The Vietnam Stock Index or VN-Index is a capitalization-weighted index of all the companies listed on 
the Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange. The index was created with a base index value of 100 as of July 28, 
2000. (Source: Bloomberg.com) 
19 Hanoi HNX Index is a capitalization-weighted price index comprising stocks traded on the Hanoi 
Securities Trading Center. (Source: Bloomberg.com) 
20 LENDRT denotes average lending rate. 
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subjected to law and regulations are categorized as unregulated industries. There 
are currently nine industries that can be classified under the regulated category: 
Real Estate with Real Estate Law No. 63/2006/QH11, Telecommunication with 
Telecommunication Law No. 41/2009/QH12, Energy, Electricity, and Gas with 
Electricity Law No. 28/2004/QH11, Petroleum with Petroleum Law 1993, 
Medicine, Healthcare, and Chemicals with Medicine Law No. 34/2005/QH11, 
Minerals with Minerals Law No. 60/2010/QH12, Food with Food Safety Law No. 
55/2010/QH12, Transportation with Law on Road Traffic No. 23/2008/QH12 and 
Maritime Law: 40/2005/QH11, Construction with Construction Law No. 
50/2014/QH13. The unregulated category includes rubber, Education, Service and 
Tourism, Plastics and Packaging, Manufacturing, Steel, Commerce, Aquaculture, 
and Construction Materials.  
 This study also examines the independent industry impact of some special 
industries on leverage. Firstly, in Vietnam, firms in the Petroleum industry and 
Energy, Electricity and Gas industry (dummy variable INDCL1) are highly regulated 
by special laws and/or are often state-owned. This may signal that these firms 
have a tendency to use high leverage. Secondly, according to the Vietnam 
Investment Review, mineral firms are highly levered due to a high level of 
investment in fixed assets, thus, having higher risks than others. Therefore, this 
study aims to test the industry difference with minerals firms (dummy variable 
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INDCL2). Thirdly, in 2013, the National Financial Supervisory Commission 
reported statistics of industries with the highest bad debt ratio, including: 
Construction, Construction Materials, Real Estate, Manufacturing, Steel, Plastics 
and Packaging, Service and Tourism, and Commerce. Also, in a study of the capital 
structure of real estate and construction firms, Phan Lan (2013) pointed out that 
said firms use significantly high leverage. In this study, these industries are 
grouped into three groups with dummy variables: INDCL3 for Construction, 
Construction Materials, and Real Estate; INDCL4 for Manufacturing, Steel, and 
Plastics and Packaging; and INDCL5 for Service and Tourism, and Commerce, 
according to how close business features are to each other.  
Table 3: Predicted effects on leverage based on capital structure theories  
Factors 














Business risk – +    
Profitability + – + +  
Firm size + –    
Growth opportunities – + – –  
Tangibility + –/+ +   
Uniqueness – –/+ –   
Average tax rate +     
Non-debt tax shields –     
Industry mean leverage      
Stock market return     – 
Average lending rate + – +  – 




B. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION 
This research has been conducted on companies listed on two stock 
exchanges in Vietnam, i.e. Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) and Hanoi Stock 
Exchange (HNX), during the five-year period from 2009 to 2010. There are 717 
firms currently listed on the two stock exchanges. The sample was selected based 
on the following criteria: 1) Firms operating in the financial services sector, such 
as banks, securities companies, investment trusts, and insurance companies are 
excluded. These firms’ liabilities are regulated according to specific financial 
industry regulations and should not be compared to non-financial firms; 2) Firms 
which are listed after 2009 are excluded due to the fact that financial statements 
of years before listing are often not very reliable; 3) Firms with data missing on 
relevant variables for any year of the period under review are excluded as this 
affects the process of data analysis; 4) Firms that stopped listing on the two stock 
exchanges in any years during the period under review are excluded; and 5) Firms 
with observed “outliers” –  extreme and unique observations of any variables are 
excluded, as such values will bias the results. The sample selection results in a 
sample of 183 companies listed on both stock exchanges, in which 92 firms are 
listed on HOSE and 91 firms are listed on HNX. 
The study used panel data from 183 firms during 2009-2013, resulting in 
915 observations in total. Yearly financial data were collected from published 
45 
 
financial statements and annual reports of firms made available by many 
different sources including S&P Capital IQ database, company websites, and 
Vietnamese securities company websites such as CafeF, Vietstock, Cophieu68, 
and VnDirect. Published financial statements by firms are prepared according to 
Vietnamese Accounting Standard (VAS) and are audited mainly by the “big four” 
international auditing companies (KPMG, Ernst & Young, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Deloitte). Data from 2008 and 2014 were collected 
for the purpose of calculating explanatory variables, i.e. profitability and business 
risk. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This study used panel data to analyze the factors affecting the financing 
decisions of firms. First, descriptive statistics were used to demonstrate the 
features of capital structure and the financing activities of listed firms in Vietnam, 
as presented by the sample data. Following this, correlation analysis was 
conducted to derive an overview of the relationship between each pair of 
variables. Subsequently, linear regression was performed as the main analysis to 
identify the best factors to explain the capital structure decisions of Vietnamese 
listed firms.  
There are two popular estimation methods for panel data: fixed-effects 
model (FEM) and random-effects model (REM). The fixed-effects model explores 
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the relationship between explanatory variables and dependent variables within 
an entity (i.e. a company in this case) and removes the effect of time-invariant 
characteristics pertaining to the entity in order to assess the net effect of the 
explanatory variables on the dependent variable. Unlike the fixed-effects model, 
the random-effects model assumes that the variation across entities is random 
and not correlated to explanatory variables in the model, allowing for time-
invariant variables to have an effect on the dependent variable.  
As far as industry dummy variables are considered in this study, the fixed-
effects model cannot perform regression on such variables because industry 
dummies for each firm are time-invariant. On the other hand, the random-effects 
model allows the presence of dummy variables because this method assumes 
individual specific effects are not correlated to the independent variables. 
However, it is very likely that the REM encounters estimation bias with such an 
assumption.  
Hence, the regressions were run with both the fixed-effects model (FEM) 
and random-effects model (REM) on only independent variables rather than 
industry dummies first, and the Hausman test was used to detect which model 
works better for the analysis. Later, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression was 
performed to assess the impact of industry classifications.  
47 
 
In this study, panel data regressions using both the fixed-effects model and 
random-effects model were conducted using Stata 11 software. To run the linear 
regression, data were grouped into their respective sources (the panel variable is 
“code”) and listed according to their respective time period (the time variable is 
“year”). Regressions were conducted for each dependent variable, including Total 
Debt to Market Value of Capital (TDM), Total Debt to Book Value of Capital (TDC), 
Long-term Debt to Market Value of Capital (LDM), and Long-term Debt to Book 
Value of Capital (LDC), and thirteen independent variables (with the exclusion of 
six industry classification variables).  
After the Hausman test specified the appropriate model (fixed or random 
effects) to be used, regressions with the selected method were conducted for all 
four leverage measures to evaluate the degree and scope of the impacts of 
capital structure factors on each measure and to compare similarities and 
differences among impacts. The overall model was assessed, and statistically 
significant explanatory variables were selected.  
As the leverage models were generated, necessary tests were used to 
determine if there were regression problems such as heteroskedasticity (modified 
Wald test), autocorrelation (Wooldridge test), and cross-sectional dependence 
(Pesaran, Frees’, and Friedman tests). Then, core models were derived that 
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overcome the identified estimation violations for each leverage measure, i.e. 
running regression with Driscoll-Kraay robust standard errors.  
The regression model showing how the factors affecting capital structure 
decisions can be presented as follows:  
Leverageit = α + β1 x F1 it + β2 x F2 it + … + βn x Fn it + ε 
In which Leverageit is the leverage ratio observed for Firm i at time t; Fit is 
the factor influencing Firm i observed at time t; α is the intercept of the 
regression model; β is the coefficient for each explanatory variable; ε is the 
random statistical errors (or disturbance) of the model, representing other factors 
that determine capital structure but not yet covered in this study.  
The pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method was conducted separately 
to determine the industry impacts of studied industries on the capital structure of 
firms. The pooled OLS method generated simple linear regression models on the 
whole data set, ignoring the panel structure of the data. More importantly, this 








CHAPTER 4: RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of the data of 183 companies. It can 
be seen that, on average, non-financial firms in Vietnamese stock exchanges were 
highly levered. The mean leverage measured by Total Debt to Market Value of 
Capital ratio (TDM) is 45.93 percent, while mean Total Debt to Book Value of 
Capital ratio (TDC) is 36.77 percent. The mean leverage measured by Long-term 
Debt to Market Value of Capital ratio (LDM) measure is 14.64 percent, while 
mean Long-term Debt to Book Value of Capital ratio (LDC) is only 12.12 percent. 
This suggests that market value ratio measures higher leverage ratios than book 
value ratios, and that a large portion of total debt is comprised of short-term 
debt. The standard deviation of TDM is 27.97 percent and the standard deviation 
of TDC is 23.33 percent, while the standard deviation of LDM is 19.61 percent and 
LDC’s is 16.55 percent. This indicates that the variation in the use of debt is quite 
large among the sampled firms, the variation among the 915 observations is 
larger when using market value measures of leverage compared to book value 
measures, and larger relative to total debt compared to only long-term debt. This 
can be explained by more volatile market data and larger fluctuations in the 
short-term borrowings of firms. The maximum value of TDM is 93.94 percent, 
meaning that at the maximum leverage ratio, 93.94 percent out of the total 
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capital of this firm is made up of debt (including short-term and long-term debt), 
and only 6.06 percent is equity. The maximum value of LDM is 80.21 percent, 
demonstrating that at the maximum leverage ratio, long-term debt accounts for 
80.21 percent of capital in market value. 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics21 
Variable Proxy Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total Debt to MV of capital TDM 915 0.4593 0.2797 0.0000 0.9394 
Total Debt to BV of capital TDC 915 0.3677 0.2333 0.0000 0.8750 
LT Debt to MV of capital LDM 915 0.1464 0.1961 0.0000 0.8021 
LT Debt to MV of capital LDC 915 0.1212 0.1655 0.0000 0.7524 
Business risk RISK 915 0.0290 0.0273 0.0000 0.1962 
Profitability ROA 915 0.0689 0.0672 -0.2000 0.3900 
Firm size SIZE 915 5.8206 0.5581 4.4377 7.8795 
Growth opportunities GROWTH 915 0.9054 0.3635 0.3269 5.5181 
Capital Expenditure CAPEX 915 0.0576 0.0909 0.0000 1.6008 
Tangibility TANG 915 0.2820 0.2153 0.0002 0.9275 
Uniqueness SGA 915 0.0949 0.1072 0.0052 2.3330 
Average tax rate TAX 915 0.1965 0.1682 0.0000 1.9318 
Depreciation DEPR 915 0.0337 0.0332 0.0001 0.2461 
Industry mean leverage INDLEV 915 0.5726 0.1222 0.3100 0.7500 
Stock market return STOCKMRT 915 0.0600 0.3278 -0.3800 0.5800 
Average lending rate LENDRT 915 0.1480 0.0299 0.1000 0.1800 
Inflation rate INFLATION 915 0.1000 0.0452 0.0600 0.1800 
Industry classifications 
Obs(INDCL) = 530        Obs(INDCL1) = 85      Obs(INDCL2) = 25 
Obs(INDCL3) = 290      Obs(INDCL4) = 150    Obs(INDCL5) = 65 
  
                                                   
21 Observed outliers are omitted for all variables  
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Table 5 summarizes the mean values of all leverage ratios and capital 
structure factors by taking the average of 183 firms in each year to see the 
change in these measures during the five-year period.  
Table 5: Means of variables 
Variable Proxy 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total Debt to MV of capital TDM 0.3683 0.4108 0.5434 0.5167 0.4574 
Total Debt to BV of capital TDC 0.3481 0.3607 0.3771 0.3815 0.3711 
LT Debt to MV of capital LDM 0.1444 0.1530 0.1669 0.1464 0.1214 
LT Debt to MV of capital LDC 0.1388 0.1343 0.1208 0.1130 0.0992 
Business risk RISK 0.0244 0.0369 0.0358 0.0307 0.0172 
Profitability ROA 0.0842 0.0785 0.0764 0.0536 0.0515 
Firm size SIZE 5.7240 5.8003 5.8488 5.8588 5.8710 
Growth opportunities GROWTH 1.0377 0.9332 0.7783 0.8328 0.9449 
Capital Expenditure CAPEX 0.0764 0.0656 0.0588 0.0395 0.0479 
Tangibility TANG 0.2956 0.2909 0.2757 0.2778 0.2700 
Uniqueness SGA 0.0853 0.0871 0.0942 0.1062 0.1016 
Average tax rate TAX 0.1687 0.2011 0.2114 0.1915 0.2099 
Depreciation DEPR 0.0343 0.0326 0.0330 0.0344 0.0340 
Industry mean leverage INDLEV 0.5635 0.5608 0.5833 0.5793 0.5760 
Stock market return STOCKMRT 0.5839 -0.1707 -0.3801 0.0743 0.2040 
Average lending rate LENDRT 0.1001 0.1437 0.1801 0.1775 0.1369 
Inflation rate INFLATION 0.0688 0.1175 0.1813 0.0681 0.0604 
It is recognized that total debt ratios including TDM and TDC were in a 
rising trend in the first three years, but in a declining trend in the later years. 
During the period from 2011 to 2013, firms became more levered than the 
previous two years in terms of market value, and less levered in terms of book 
value. Average TDC in 2011 was 37.71 percent, approximately 3 percent higher 
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than it was in 2009. Average TDM in 2011 was 54.34 percent, approximately 18 
percent higher than it was in 2009. This figure reduced to 45.74 percent in 2013, 
yet this can still be seen as a high level. The reason for the sharper increase in 
TDM than TDC might be due to the down-trend of the stock market, which leads 
to lower market value of capital. With regard to long-term debt ratios, LDM and 
LDC have decreasing trends as the data moves towards 2013 – as average LDM 
was 14.44 percent in 2009 and 12.14 percent in 2013, and LDC was 13.88 percent 
in 2009 and 9.92 percent in 2013. The overall decreasing trends of LDM and LDC 
can be explained by an increase in the short-term borrowings proportion of debt. 
Combining the upward total debt ratios and downward long-term ratios, it can be 
seen that firms have increased in leverage recently, especially with regard to 
short-term debt.  In order to minimize credit risk, banks have had a tendency to 
prefer making short-term loans rather than long-term loans during the economic 
downturn in Vietnam. Consequently, firms face less difficulty when borrowing in 
the short-term rather than the long-term.  
Business risk (RISK), as measured by the standard deviation of yearly ROA, 
has fluctuated significantly during the five year period. At the peak of the 
recession, in 2010 and 2011, firms faced more volatile revenues and earnings. 
During this period, RISK reached the highest levels of 3.69 percent and 3.58 
percent respectively.  These levels reduced to 1.72 percent in 2013 when the 
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economy was on its way to recovery. This indicates that the average level of 
business risk varied across time because a firm’s ability to generate earnings 
changed over time and along with economic cycles.  
Profitability has been in a clear downward trend as average ROA has 
reduced from 8.42 percent in 2009 to 5.15 percent in 2013.  Such a decrease in 
profitability could reflect the lasting negative impact of the 2008 – 2011 recession 
on the business performance of firms. Also, the decrease in ROA could be 
explained in part by the growth in firm size (SIZE), measured by Log(Total Assets), 
which increased from 5.72 in 2009 to 5.87 in 2013, making ROA smaller. (See 
Table 5)  
The average value of growth opportunities (GROWTH), measured by 
market value to book value of assets, was generally less than 1, except in the year 
2009, indicating that the market perceived a low growth prospect for firms. On 
average, Vietnamese listed firms have made less new capital expenditure per unit 
of asset, as can be seen from a decreased CAPEX from 7.64 percent in 2009 to 
4.79 percent in 2013, another signal of limited growth opportunities.  
Tangibility (TANG), measured by net property, plant and equipment, has 
fluctuated slightly on average during the five years. The proportion of long-term 
tangible assets to total assets decreased to 27.57 percent in 2011 from the 
highest value of 29.56 percent in 2009, and has been maintained at that same 
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level. This suggests that the tangibility of assets did not change greatly over time. 
Meanwhile, the ratio of selling, general & administration (SGA) expenses to net 
sales increased from 8.53 percent in 2009 to 10.16 percent in 2013, meaning that 
firms have increased spending on SGA expenses that could possibly be wasted on 
organizational inefficiencies or invested in more intangible assets.   
In general, average tax rate (TAX) calculated for the sampled firms on 
average was kept within an increasing trend from 16.87 percent in 2009 to 20.99 
percent in 2013. This shows that firms have faced a tougher environment with 
higher tax expenses, despite government efforts toward tax support. Meanwhile, 
depreciation (DEPR), as a proxy for non-debt tax shields and measured by 
depreciation expense divided by total assets, only experienced slight fluctuation 
on average across the five years. While average tax rate increased and non-debt 
tax shields stayed the same, firms valued the benefit from debt tax shields more.  
The mean industry leverage is 57.01 percent, with the highest industry 
leverage at 75.00 percent (Construction industry in 2013) and the lowest at 31.00 
percent (Food industry in 2009). The lowest and highest average values of 
industry leverage in the five years are 56.08 percent (in 2010) to 58.33 percent (in 
2011), relatively higher than the mean leverage ratios calculated for firms in this 
study. This is due to different calculation methods and the fact that industry 
mean leverage (INDLEV) of each year is based on the composition of stocks in 
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eighteen different industries, while our leverage measures (TDM, TDC) are based 
on the average of 183 firms in the sample. However, TDM is likely to move in the 
same direction with INDLEV, as they all increased in 2011 and subsequently 
experienced a slight decrease in the two later years. (See Table 5) 
On average, stock market return (STOCKMRT), as a proxy for stock market 
condition, has large variation across the years, with the lowest rate of -38.01 
percent in 2011 and the highest rate of 58.39 percent in 2009, with standard 
deviation of 32.78 percent. This reflects a highly volatile stock market condition in 
Vietnam. Average lending rate in the market, as the proxy for debt market 
condition, ranges from 10.00 percent to 18.00 percent. When inflation, as a proxy 
for macroeconomics condition, reached the highest rate in 2011, the lending rate 
also increased to the highest level. Both inflation and lending rate are in a 
decreasing trend from 2011 to 2013. (See Table 5) 
B. CORRELATION TEST RESULTS 
Table 6 presents the correlation matrix of leverage ratios and factors, 
showing how each pair of variables moves in relation to each other. From this 
table, the direction that any two variables vary together, the strength of 
correlation (correlation coefficient, denoted by r), and the level of statistical 
significance can be interpreted. The stars denote the correlation that is 
statistically significant at significance level α = 0.01, α = 0.05, or α = 0.1.  
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The correlation between Total Debt to Market Value of Capital (TDM) and 
Total Debt to Book Value of Capital (TDC) and that between Long-term Debt to 
Market Value of Capital (LDM) and Long-term Debt to Book Value of Capital (LDC) 
are very high, with the correlation coefficients (r) of 91 percent and 96 percent, 
respectively. This means market value and book value of capital are highly 
correlated and fairly consistent in measuring leverage.  
Business risk (RISK), as measured by the standard deviation of ROA, has a 
negative relation to all four leverage ratios and these correlations are statistically 
significant. However, the correlation coefficients for these relationships are quite 
low (from 6% with LDC to -13% with TDM). This relationship is supported by 
trade-off theory, which states that firms borrow less when business risk increases 
due to higher expected costs of financial distress. Further, business risk is also 
correlated with other factors such as profitability (ROA), firm size (SIZE), average 
tax rate (TAX), industry mean leverage (INDLEV), stock market return 
(STOCKMRT), average lending rate (LENDRT), and inflation rate (INFLATION), as 
demonstrated in Table 6.   
Profitability (ROA) is negatively correlated with all four leverage ratios and 
all these relationships are significant at α = 0.01. This suggests that profitability is 
likely to have an inverse influence on debt ratios, matching the predicted sign 
made by pecking order theory (See Table 3). The correlation coefficient of ROA 
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with TDM is -0.30, showing a moderate correlation. Profitability is also correlated 
with other factors such as growth opportunities, tangibility, uniqueness, average 
tax rate, depreciation, industry mean leverage, lending rate, inflation rate. Most 
of the correlation coefficients are small, except for growth opportunities (r = 
0.36). This suggests that the profitability and growth opportunities of a firm could 
move in the same direction.  
Firm size (SIZE), measured by log of total assets, is positively correlated 
with all four leverage ratios and these relationships are statistically significant at 
α = 0.01. This implies that firm size is likely to positively affect the level of debt 
that firms use in financing decisions. The correlation coefficient r of SIZE with 
TDM, TDC, LDM, and LDC are 28 percent, 38 percent, 37 percent, and 42 percent 
respectively, indicating moderate correlations. This result is consistent with trade-
off theory that larger firms are more stable with low business risk, so they have 
higher leverage than that of small firms, but it contradicts agency and pecking 
order theories that suggest larger firms have a lower degree of information 
asymmetry and more retained cash, causing them to use less debt.  
Growth opportunities (GROWTH), measured by market to book value of 
assets, is negatively related to TDM, TDC, LDM but mostly with a weak correlation 
– except for a moderate correlation with TDM. These negative relationships 
match the direction predicted by trade-off theory and agency theory that firms 
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having more growth opportunities have higher expected costs of financial distress 
and bear more agency costs, so they prefer equity financing and reduce leverage. 
Meanwhile, CAPEX, another measure of growth opportunities, is positively 
correlated with all four ratios. This supports the idea that firms which spend more 
on growth opportunities, (i.e. investing more in capital expenditure), need more 
funds and prefer debt to external equity, as established by pecking order theory.  
Correlation results of tangibility of assets (TANG) show that this factor 
positively varies with four debt ratios at a high level of significance. Tangibility of 
assets has moderate relationships with total leverage ratios (r = 16% and 19% 
with TDM and TDC respectively) but strong relationships with long-term leverage 
ratios (r = 56% with both LDM and LDC). It can be predicted that tangibility is a 
potential factor affecting leverage, especially long-term borrowing. Evidence of 
this positive impact is supported by most theories, including trade-off theory, 
pecking order theory, and agency theory. Firms having more tangible assets can 
borrow more easily on the market, as they have lower costs of financial distress 
and fewer debt-related agency problems, thus having higher leverage. On the 
other hand, SGA, a proxy for uniqueness of assets, shows negative correlations 
with debt ratios but with very small correlation coefficients.  As suggested by 
trade-off theory, the more unique the firm’s assets are, the higher the cost of 




Table 6: Correlation Matrix22 
 TDM TDC LDM LDC RISK ROA SIZE GROWTH 
TDM  1.00        
TDC  0.91***  1.00       
LDM  0.53***  0.53***  1.00      
LDC  0.48***  0.57***  0.96***  1.00     
RISK -0.13*** -0.10*** -0.08* -0.06*  1.00    
ROA -0.30*** -0.20*** -0.15*** -0.13***  0.21***  1.00   
SIZE  0.28***  0.38***  0.37***  0.42*** -0.11***  0.002  1.00  
GROWTH -0.22*** -0.01 -0.07**  0.03  0.01  0.36***  0.20***  1.00 
CAPEX  0.03  0.08*  0.22***  0.24***  0.02  0.07**  0.02  0.10*** 
TANG  0.16***  0.19***  0.56***  0.56***  0.03  0.07**  0.14*** -0.0004 
SGA -0.15*** -0.16*** -0.04 -0.03  0.01 -0.14*** -0.04  0.03 
TAX  0.06*  0.05  0.02  0.02 -0.14*** -0.15***  0.09*** -0.02 
DEPR  0.15***  0.15***  0.40***  0.37***  0.03  0.21***  0.03 -0.0001 
INDLEV  0.37***  0.31***  0.17***  0.16*** -0.09*** -0.28***  0.03 -0.07** 
INDCL -0.05* -0.03  0.17***  0.18*** -0.07** -0.06*  0.21***  0.09*** 
INDCL1 -0.01  0.02  0.16***  0.17***  0.01  0.02  0.30*** -0.03 
INDCL2  0.11***  0.11***  0.27***  0.25***  0.06*  0.15***  0.03  0.07** 
INDCL3  0.24***  0.20***  0.09***  0.09*** -0.06* -0.20*** -0.02 -0.01 
INDCL4  0.08**  0.07** -0.15*** -0.15***  0.002  0.06* -0.07* -0.02 
INDCL5 -0.06* -0.08** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.05 -0.14*** -0.05 -0.04 
STOCKMRT -0.16*** -0.03 -0.05  0.01 -0.20*** -0.002 -0.06*  0.21*** 
LENDRT  0.22***  0.05  0.03 -0.04  0.13*** -0.09***  0.08** -0.24*** 
INFLATION  0.11***  0.01  0.05*  0.02 -0.20***  0.10***  0.01 -0.16*** 
 
 CAPEX TANG SGA TAX DEPR INDLEV INDCL INDCL1 
CAPEX  1.00             
TANG  0.35***  1.00           
SGA -0.04 -0.05  1.00         
TAX  0.03 -0.06* -0.03  1.00       
DEPR  0.22***  0.58*** -0.07** -0.06*  1.00     
INDLEV  0.02 -0.07** -0.05  0.14*** -0.08**  1.00   
INDCL  0.002  0.02  0.06*  0.02  0.14***  0.05  1.00  
INDCL1 -0.02  0.13*** -0.09*** -0.01  0.07** -0.09***  0.26***  1.00 
INDCL2  0.15***  0.20*** -0.002 -0.04  0.60***  0.03  0.14*** -0.05 
INDCL3 -0.03 -0.14***  0.02  0.12*** -0.20***  0.74***  0.10*** -0.22*** 
INDCL4 -0.05 -0.13*** -0.05 -0.07** -0.07** -0.25*** -0.52*** -0.14*** 
INDCL5 -0.01 -0.06*  0.03  0.08** -0.14*** -0.07** -0.32*** -0.09*** 
STOCKMRT  0.04  0.02  0.01 -0.07**  0.02 -0.03 -0.00  0.00 
LENDRT -0.10*** -0.03  0.05  0.06 -0.005  0.06*  0.00 -0.00   
INFLATION  0.03 -0.003 -0.02  0.05 -0.02  0.02 -0.00 -0.00 
 
 INDCL2 INDCL3 INDCL4 INDCL5 STOCKMRT LENDRT INFLATON 
INDCL2  1.00       
INDCL3 -0.11***  1.00      
INDCL4 -0.07** -0.30***  1.00     
INDCL5 -0.05 -0.20*** -0.12***  1.00    
STOCKMRT  0.00 -0.00  0.00 -0.00  1.00   
LENDRT  0.00 -0.00 -0.00  0.00 -0.78*** 1.00  
INFLATION  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.00 -0.83*** 0.47*** 1.00 
                                                   




Tax expense (TAXEXP) does not have a statistically significant relationship 
with leverage measures, except for a weak correlation with Total Debt to Market 
Value of Capital (TDM). This indicates that when taxes increase, Vietnamese listed 
firms do not necessarily borrow more to benefit from the debt-tax shields, as 
suggested by trade-off theory. On the other hand, the ratio of depreciation 
expense to total assets (DEPR), as a proxy for non-debt tax shields, is positively 
correlated to all four leverage measures at 0.01 significance level. The 
relationship is, however, fairly weak with TDM (r = 15%) and TDC (r = 15%), but 
moderate with LDM (r = 40%) and LDC (r = 37%). This result does not agree with 
the negative direction that trade-off theory would suggest. 
Industry mean leverage (INDLEV) and debt ratios vary together in the same 
direction. In Table 3, correlation coefficients of INDLEV with four debt ratios are 
all positive and these relationships are significant at 0.01. The correlation of 
INDLEV and TDM is moderate (r = 37%). This could infer that firm leverage follows 
industry median leverage, as supported by previous empirical findings. 
The correlation matrix indicates that stock market return (STOCKMRT), as a 
proxy for stock market condition, is negatively related to Total Debt to Market 
Value of Capital (TDM), while it does not have any significant relation to other 
debt ratios. In addition, average lending rate (LENDRT) and inflation rate 
(INFLATION) both have a positive correlation with TDM. Besides TDM, Inflation 
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rate is also positively correlated to Long-term Debt to Market Value of Capital 
(LDM). Such results show that market conditions and macroeconomic conditions 
are likely to affect firm leverage, according to the market timing theory.   
 Industry classification represents many variables that affect capital 
structure, (i.e. six industry dummies in this study for different industry groups). 
Most of the industry dummy variables are showing weak to moderate correlation 
with leverage ratios at 0.01 or 0.05 significance level. Whether the industry is 
highly regulated or not, as represented by INDCL, makes a difference in LDM and 
LDC (r = 0.17 and 0.18, relatively); and whether or not a firm belongs to the 
examined industries, including Petroleum, and Energy, Electricity, and Gas; 
Minerals; Construction, Construction Materials, and Real Estate; Manufacturing, 
Steel, and Plastics and Packaging; Service and Tourism and Commerce industries, 
has moderate correlation on firm leverage ratios (i.e. the correlation coefficient 
between INDCL2 and LDM = 0.27). These results show evidence that capital 
structure is possibly affected by industry classifications, or firms belonging to 
specified groups have higher leverage.   
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C. REGRESSION RESULTS 
This study presents analysis of determinants of capital structure using four 
leverage measures as proposed in the previous sections to clarify if the 
relationships between the factors and leverage truly exist and in which specific 
directions. 
Table 7 shows regression results based on the fixed-effects model for each 
of the four leverage measures, including regression coefficients for each 
explanatory variable, their corresponding t-value, level of statistical significance 
of the coefficient, and within R2 value for each regression model. All FEM models 
presented in Table 7 are statistically significant with Prob > F = 0.000. 
Table 8 demonstrates regression results based on the random-effects 
model for each of the four leverage measures, including regression coefficients 
for each explanatory variable, their corresponding z-value, level of statistical 
significance of the coefficient, and overall R2 value for each regression model. All 






Table 7: Fixed-effects regression results 

















































































































R-sq - within23  0.4066  0.2406  0.1779     0.2048 
Prob > F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
 
***Significant at 0.01 
**Significant at 0.05 




                                                   
23 In fixed-effects model, the R-square to concern is Within R-square, because it estimates the within-
subject (within-group) variance by computing the differences between observed values and their means. 
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Table 8: Random-effects regression results 

















































































































R-sq - overall24  0.3392  0.2638  0.4742  0.4762 
Prob > chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
***Significant at 0.01 
**Significant at 0.05 
*Significant at 0.1 
 
                                                   
24 In random-effects model, the R-square to concern is Overall R-square. 
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Next, the Hausman test helps specify which of the above two methods, 
fixed-effects model (FEM) and random-effects model (REM), works better for the 
data set being studied. Results show that Prob>chi2 = 0.0000. This means that the 
Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis in all four cases. There is strong 
evidence that the fixed-effects model is the suitable method for the regression 
model of all four leverage ratios. 
Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
Table 9: Hausman test results 
 TDM TDC LDM LDC 
Chi2 58.55 70.23 54.20 97.33 
Prob > Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Conclusion Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho 
Selected model FEM FEM FEM FEM 
To deliver better regressions with the fixed-effects model, the explanatory 
variables that are not statistically significant are removed from the above models. 
Fixed-effects regressions with four dependent variables, Total Debt to Market 
Value of Capital (TDM), Total Debt to Book Value of Capital (TDC), Long-term Debt 
to Market Value of Capital (LDM), and Long-term Debt to Book Value of Capital 
(LDC) are conducted again for the respective sets of selected statistically 
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R-sq - within  0.4009  0.2307  0.1723  0.1961 
Prob > F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
 
***Significant at 0.01 
**Significant at 0.05 




To detect typical estimation issues in the models (1), (2), (3), and (4) above, 
the next analysis employs suitable statistical tests for fixed-effects regression. 
Test for heteroskedasticity 
This study uses the modified Wald test (Greene, 2000) for groupwise 
heteroskedasticity, following the regression models above. This test helps detect 
whether the errors are uncorrelated and normally distributed, and that their 
variances are constant and do not vary with the effects modelled.  
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 










chi2 (183) 27538.24 240000 190000 190000 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
The p-value is 0.0000 in four cases, suggesting that the modified Wald test 
strongly rejects the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis. In other 
words, there is strong evidence for the existence of heteroskedasticity in the 
estimation. The presence of such heteroskedasticity can invalidate the 
significance of the statistical model.  This study deals with this violation, as 
discussed below, by deriving robust standard errors for the estimation. 
 Test for autocorrelation 
 This study uses the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation (Wooldridge, 2002) 
following the fixed-effects regression results above. This study assumes that there 
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is no correlation between a time-series with its own past and future values; this 
test determines if such a correlation exists.  
H0: no first order autocorrelation 










F (1,182) 204.890 181.982 97.176 36.996 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Since p-value equals 0.0000, the Wooldridge test rejects the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation, meaning that there is strong evidence for the 
existence of an autocorrelation issue in the regression models. This study deals 
with this violation, as mentioned below, by running the regressions with Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors.  
 Test for cross-sectional dependence 
 Because the panel data set used in this research is composed of many 
cross-sectional units and few time-series observations, it may suffer from cross-
sectional dependence. To test the presence of a cross-sectional dependence 
issue, this study employs three methods: Pesaran by Pesaran (2004), Frees’ by 






1) Pesaran test 










Pesaran's test of cross 
sectional independence 
-1.393 5.656 13.172 15.805 
Pr 1.8364 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Average absolute value of 
the off-diagonal elements 
0.509 0.496 0.474 0.470 
Since p-values are large for the TDM model, there is not enough evidence 
to reject the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence for the TDM 
model, meaning that there is possibly a cross-sectional dependence estimation 
issue. On the other hand, test results for TDC, LDM, and LDC models show 
evidence of the existence of cross-sectional independence (p-value = 0.0000). 
2) Frees’ test 









Frees' test of cross-sectional 
independence 
15.142 9.196 8.512 9.878 
Critical values from Frees' Q 
distribution: 
alpha = 0.10:  
alpha = 0.05 : 






Since Frees’ statistics for four models are larger than critical value at the 
smallest significance level 0.01, the tests reject the null hypothesis. There is 




3) Friedman's test  










Friedman's test of cross 
sectional independence  
1.915 20.463 34.330 42.417 
Pr 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Since Friedman’s p-value is large for all tests, there is not enough evidence 
to reject the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence. 
 Because at least two out of three tests provide strong evidence for the 
presence of cross-sectional dependence, it can be concluded that the panel 
models have a cross-sectional dependence issue. This study deals with the 
violation in estimation as follows: 
 Dealing with the violations 
The Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors for coefficients are 
calculated to avoid estimation biases caused by heteroskedasticity, 
autocorrelation, and cross-sectional dependence. This technique works for the 
data used in this study because the size of the cross-sectional dimension does not 
affect the feasibility, even if the number of panels (factors) is much larger than 
the number of time series (years) (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998). The following are 





Table 16: TDM fixed-effects regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =      915 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                           Number of groups  =   183 
Group variable (i): code                                            F(  7,   182)    = 889.73   
Maximum lag: 2                                                         Prob > F          =  0.0000   







ROA -0.7432*** 0.1014  -7.33 0.0000 -0.9433 -0.5431 
SIZE  0.4976*** 0.0609   8.18 0.0000  0.3775  0.6177 
GROWTH -0.1450*** 0.0144 -10.05 0.0000 -0.1734 -0.1165 
TANG  0.1567*** 0.0530   2.95 0.0040  0.0520  0.2613 
STOCKMRT  0.1699*** 0.0117   14.47 0.0000  0.1467  0.1931 
LENDRT  1.4730*** 0.0416   35.37 0.0000  1.3908  1.5552 
INFLATION  1.0786*** 0.1024   10.54 0.0000  0.8766  1.2806 
_cons -2.6350*** 0.3786  -6.96 0.0000 -3.3820 -1.8880 
 
Table 17: TDC fixed-effect regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =      915 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                           Number of groups  =   183 
Group variable (i): code                                            F(  7,   182)    =    115.08   
Maximum lag: 2                                                         Prob > F          =  0.0000   




T P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
RISK  0.3067** 0.1284  2.39 0.0180  0.0533  0.5602 
ROA -0.5055*** 0.0798 -6.34 0.0000 -0.6628 -0.3481 
SIZE  0.4481*** 0.0659  6.80 0.0000  0.3181  0.5781 
TANG  0.1593** 0.0719  2.22 0.0280  0.0175  0.3012 
INDLEV  0.1889*** 0.0680  2.78 0.0060  0.0548  0.3230 
STOCKMRT  0.0876*** 0.0235  3.72 0.0000  0.0411  0.1340 
INFLATION  0.5484*** 0.1751  3.13 0.0020  0.2028  0.8939 
_cons -2.4275*** 0.3836 -6.33 0.0000 -3.1844 -1.6707 
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Table 18: LDM fixed-effect regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors    Number of obs        =      915 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                            Number of groups  =   183 
Group variable (i): code                                             F(  8,   182)   =   157.95   
Maximum lag: 2                                                          Prob > F         =  0.0000   




T P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
RISK  0.4127*** 0.1007 4.10 0.0000  0.2140  0.6115 
SIZE  0.1327*** 0.0275 4.82 0.0000  0.0784  0.1870 
GROWTH -0.0528*** 0.0065  -8.14 0.0000 -0.0656 -0.0400 
CAPEX  0.0733*** 0.0179 4.09 0.0000  0.0379  0.1087 
TANG  0.3076*** 0.0579 5.32 0.0000  0.1934  0.4218 
SGA  0.1748*** 0.0178 9.83 0.0000  0.1397  0.2099 
STOCKMRT  0.0525*** 0.0100 5.25 0.0000  0.0328  0.0722 
INFLATION  0.4635*** 0.0826 5.61 0.0000  0.3004  0.6265 














Table 19: LDC fixed-effect regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs        =      915 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                           Number of groups  =      183 
Group variable (i): code                                            F(  8,   182)  =  208.19   
Maximum lag: 2                                                         Prob > F        =  0.0000   




T P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
RISK  0.4572*** 0.1216  3.76 0.0000  0.2173  0.6972 
SIZE  0.0977*** 0.0096  10.18 0.0000  0.0788   0.1166 
CAPEX  0.0874*** 0.0234  3.73 0.0000  0.0412  0.1336 
TANG  0.2572*** 0.0639  4.03 0.0000  0.1311  0.3832 
SGA  0.1701*** 0.0087  19.61 0.0000  0.1530  0.1872 
INDLEV  0.1733*** 0.0302  5.74 0.0000  0.1137  0.2328 
LENDRT -0.5456*** 0.1195 -4.56 0.0000 -0.7814 -0.3098 
INFLATION  0.1781*** 0.0552  3.23 0.0010  0.0692  0.2870 
_cons -0.5906*** 0.0690 -8.56 0.0000 -0.7268 -0.4544 
 
*** Significant at 0.01 
** Significant at 0.05 
Lag length of m(T)= floor[4(T/100)^(2/9)] = 2 with T=5 
The fixed-effect regressions with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors provide the 
same coefficients but different standard errors, absolute values of critical value 
(t), and confidence interval of each variable, in comparison to the results in Table 
10 above. This regression can provide a more reliable estimation that overcomes 
the detected issues. A summary of the four leverage models is given below. 
(1) The TDM model  
The within R-squared of the TDM model is 0.4009, meaning that selected 
factors, profitability (ROA), firm size (SIZE), growth opportunities (GROWTH), 
74 
 
tangibility (TANG), stock market return (STOCKMRT), average lending rate 
(LENDRT) and inflation rate (INFLATION) can explain 40.09 percent of the 
variability of leverage, as measured by Total Debt to Market value of Capital. (See 
Table 16) 
(2) The TDC model  
The within R-squared of the TDC model is 0.2307, meaning that selected 
factors business risk (RISK), profitability (ROA), firm size (SIZE), tangibility (TANG), 
industry leverage (INDLEV), stock market return (STOCKMRT), inflation rate 
(INFLATION) can explain 23.07% percent of the variability of leverage, as 
measured by Total Debt to Book value of Capital. (See Table 17) 
(3) The LDM model  
The within R-squared of the LDM model is 0.1723, meaning that selected 
factors, including business risk (RISK), firm size (SIZE), growth opportunities 
(GROWTH), capital expenditure (CAPEX), tangibility (TANG), uniqueness (SGA), 
stock market return (STOCKMRT), inflation rate (INFLATION) can explain 17.23 
percent of the variability of leverage, as measured by Long-term Debt to Market 
value of Capital. (See Table 18) 
(4) The LDC model  
The within R-squared of the LDC model is 0.1961, meaning that selected 
factors business risk (RISK), firm size (SIZE), capital expenditure (CAPEX), 
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tangibility (TANG), uniqueness (SGA), industry leverage (INDLEV), average lending 
rate (LENDRT), inflation rate (INFLATION) can explain 19.61 percent of the 
variability of leverage as measured by Long-term Debt to Book value of Capital. 
(See Table 19) 
To evaluate how firm leverage is influenced by industry classifications 
measured by dummy variables INDCL (regulated or unregulated), INDCL1 
(Petroleum, and Energy, Electricity, and Gas industries), INDCL2 (Minerals 
industry), INDCL3 (Construction, Construction Materials, and Real Estate 
industries), INDCL4 (Manufacturing, Steel, and Plastics and Packaging industries), 
INDCL5 (Service and Tourism, and Commerce industries), the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) method is performed on the data to detect the industry effects.  
Table 20 shows that INDCL (regulated or unregulated), INDCL2 (Minerals 
industry), and INDCL3 (Construction, Construction Materials, and Real Estate 
industries) are found to have statistically significant influence on leverage ratios, 
while INDCL1 (Petroleum, and Energy, Electricity, and Gas industries) and INDCL4 
(Manufacturing, Steel, and Plastics and Packaging industries) are revealed to have 






Table 20: OLS regression results with industry dummies 
    TDM   TDC    LDM     LDC 
RISK -0.6135 -0.1705 -0.2242 -0.0153 
ROA -1.0079 -0.7875 -0.4959 -0.4459 
SIZE  0.1522  0.1594  0.1025  0.1002 
GROWTH -0.0945  0.0270 -0.0429 -0.0029 
CAPEX -0.0159  0.0368  0.0607  0.0700 
TANG  0.1225  0.1063  0.4317  0.3655 
SGA -0.3727 -0.3036 -0.0284 -0.0093 
TAX -0.0764 -0.0528 -0.0228 -0.0172 
DEPR  1.2796  1.0399  0.3970  0.1768 

















































STOCKMRT  0.1058  0.0160  0.0392  0.0305 
LENDRT  1.7413  0.0404 -0.1357 -0.4528 
INFLATION  0.8228  0.2765  0.5903  0.4557 
_cons -0.9574 -0.8306 -0.6403 -0.5924 
R-sq   0.4287  0.3621  0.5208  0.5295 
Prob > F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Table 21 demonstrates the main findings of the regression analysis of 







Table 21: Summary of findings 















Firm size SIZE (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
Inflation rate INFLATION (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
Tangibility TANG (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
Business risk RISK  (+) (+) (+) (+) 




INDCL3 (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 




Profitability ROA (–) (–)   (–) 
Growth opportunities GROWTH (–)  (–)  (–) 
Industry mean leverage INDLEV  (+)  (+) (+) 
Average lending rate  LNDRT (+)   (–) (+/–) 
Uniqueness SGA   (+) (+) (+) 
Growth opportunities  CAPEX   (+) (+) (+) 
Industry class - 
Regulated 
INDCL (–) (–) (+)  (–/+) 
Industry class - 
Manufacturing 
INDCL4 (+) (+)   (+) 
Irrelevant 
factors28 
Average tax rate TAX     NA29 
Non-debt tax shields DEPR          NA 





        NA 
Industry class-Tourism, 
Commerce 
INDCL5          NA 
                                                   
25 Have statistically significant relation to all four leverage measures, mostly at 0.01 significance level. 
26 Industry class means industry classification. 
27 Have statistically significant relation to three or two leverage measures, mostly at 0.01 significance level. 
28 Factors that do not have any statistically significant relation to any of leverage measures. 
29 Not available 
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The following are the key findings and justifications for the main capital 
structure factors identified in the above analysis and summarized in Table 21. 
Group 1: Highly influential factors 
This study has identified the six most important and reliable factors 
influencing the capital structure of Vietnamese listed firms. These are factors that 
either have statistically significant influences on all four leverage measures, or on 
three leverage ratios but mostly at a high significance level (α = 0.01 or 0.05). 
They are: 1) firm size (SIZE), 2) tangibility (TANG), 3) inflation rate (INFLATION) as 
a proxy for macroeconomic condition, 4) business risk (RISK), 5) stock market 
return (STOCKMRT) as a proxy for stock market condition, 6) industry 
classification for Construction, Construction Materials, and Real Estate industries 
(INDCL3) and Mineral industry (INDCL2).  
1) Firm size 
The study reveals that firm size (SIZE), measured by log of total assets, has 
a positive impact on the leverage of Vietnamese listed firms. Overall, larger firms 
will be more levered by debt financing, both in term of total debt or long-term 
debt. Also, whether debt ratios are measured with total debt or long-term debt, 
market value or book value of capital, this study finds strong evidence of the 
existence of a statistically significant relationship between firm size and leverage.  
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This finding rests on the premise of trade-off theory that larger and older 
firms are likely to borrow more due to having lower bankruptcy risk and ability to 
issue debt at lower costs thanks to better credibility. This finding is consistent 
with what can be observed in the capital market in Vietnam, where larger firms 
have more advantages and easier access to bank loans. In recent years, only large 
firms have been granted the ability to issue corporate bonds in the market.  
This also confirms the assertion of pecking order theory that larger and 
older firms often build more internal equity, and thus have less of a tendency to 
borrow externally. From an empirical standpoint, this study reaches the same 
conclusion on the positive effect of firm size on leverage as the studies conducted 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Huang and Song (2002), Bauer (2004), Frank and Goyal 
(2009), and especially, Phi Anh (2010) and Anh and Yen (2014) for Vietnamese 
firms.  
2) Tangibility 
Tangibility of assets (TANG) is found to have positive influence on leverage 
for Vietnamese listed firms. Firms that have a higher proportion of tangible assets 
will be more levered. This can be explained through trade-off theory, as firms can 
borrow at lower costs by using tangible assets as collaterals in debt financing – 
reducing the financial distress costs. This finding is also consistent with agency 
theory, since high tangibility helps reduce agency problems by preventing asset 
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substitution. Other studies that also found a positive relationship between 
tangibility and leverage include Rajan and Zingales (1995), Frank and Goyal 
(2009), Huang and Song (2002), Cortez and Susanto (2012), Nunkoo and Boateng 
(2010), and especially, Okuda and Nhung (2012) – in the case of Vietnam. 
3) Inflation rate 
According to the findings of this study, inflation rate (INFLATION) has a 
positive impact on leverage of Vietnamese listed firms. This finding matches the 
prediction made by trade-off theory that tax advantage is more valuable when 
inflation is high, therefore leverage and expected inflation have a positive 
relationship. This finding is also supported by market timing theory in that 
inflation leads to a lower real cost of debt, thus firms borrow more when inflation 
is high. On the empirical side of the matter, this finding agrees with Frank and 
Goyal (2009), but contradicts Chi (2013) on the direction of the impact of inflation 
on the leverage of Vietnamese firms.  
4) Business risk 
This study reveals that business risk has a positive influence on leverage of 
Vietnamese listed firms. The higher the business risk firms have, the more debt is 
used in firms’ capital structure. This finding does not follow the prediction 
provided by trade-off theory that firms with more risky earnings should have less 
debt as they face higher financial distress costs from fixed commitments to debt 
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holders and benefit less from tax shields. Instead, the result confirms the 
principle of pecking order theory that firms with more risky earnings have higher 
levels of information asymmetry, and therefore have more debt. Vietnamese 
firms face a high level of business risk due to the highly volatile and risky business 
environment of a developing economy – especially in the financial crisis of 2010 
and 2011. In response to this, Vietnamese firms have generally increased debt 
financing.  
Empirically, this study disagrees with Bauer (2004) and Phi Anh (2010) 
about the direction of the relationship between leverage and business risk. These 
two studies conclude that business risk inversely affects leverage.  However, the 
findings of this study agree with Huang and Song (2002), and especially, Nguyen 
and Ramachandran (2006) on the positive relationship between leverage and 
business risk for Vietnamese firms.  
5) Stock market condition 
The findings of this study also point out that stock market rate of return 
(STOCKMRT), as a proxy for stock market condition, has a positive impact on 
leverage ratios in Vietnamese listed firms; in other words, the firm’s capital 
structure decision is influenced by movement in the stock market. More 
specifically, leverage moves in the same direction with stock market return. 
Although the finding agrees with market timing theories that stock market return 
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is one of the influential factors in determining firm capital structure, it conflicts 
with what is proposed under market timing theories in terms of the positivity or 
negativity of the relationship. As stock market return measures the average 
returns of all firms in the market, it can signal the average market expectation of 
the business performance of firms and the overall health of the economy. When 
stock market conditions are favorable, it is likely that firms will have better access 
to capital in general, and the debt market in particular, i.e. it will become easier 
to issue corporate bonds or borrow from banks at lower rate.  
6) Industry classification  
When examining some special industries, this study finds strong evidence 
regarding the relationship between leverage ratios and the industry the firm 
belongs to. Construction, Construction Materials, and Real Estate industries, 
represented by INDCL3, are found to have a positive influence on the debt ratios. 
This means that firms belonging to this group have higher leverage than others. 
From the period 2006 - 2007, Vietnam was booming with sizable construction 
projects, and construction and real estate companies often borrowed heavily to 
finance their operation. This led them to inherit high financial distress costs when 
the economy was in downturn during the last few years of this study.  
The study also identifies that industry classification for the Minerals 
industry (INDCL2) has a positive relationship to leverage, demonstrating that 
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firms belonging to the Minerals industry have higher leverage than others. This 
finding confirms the observation of high leverage ratio of minerals companies by 
critics.   
Group 2: Moderately influential factors 
This study identifies factors that have moderate influence on the financial 
leverage of Vietnamese listed firms. These are factors that have either influenced 
only two leverage ratios out of four, or three leverage measures but  at low 
significance level (α = 0.1 or 0.05).  They include: 1) profitability (ROA), 2) growth 
opportunities (GROWTH and CAPEX), 3) industry mean leverage, 4) average 
ending rate, as a proxy for debt market condition, 5) uniqueness, 6) industry 
classification for regulated industry (INDCL) and Manufacturing, Steel, Plastics and 
Packaging industries (INDCL4).  
1) Profitability 
The results show that profitability (ROA) has a negative impact on leverage 
for Vietnamese listed firms, yet only for total debt ratios, not long-term debt 
ratios. In general, when profitability increases, firms will borrow less, but will not 
change their long-term financing decisions. It can be inferred that profitability 
primarily influences the short-term debt of firms.  
This finding is consistent with pecking order theory in that firms prefer 
internal financing to external financing, as proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984). 
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This finding also agrees with previous empirical studies that show an inverse 
relationship between profitability and leverage, such as Titman and Wessels 
(1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), and Frank and Goyal (2009), Huang and Song 
(2002), Bauer (2004), Cortez and Susanto (2012), Kim et al. (2006), and especially 
Chi (2013) and Phi Anh (2010) for Vietnamese firms.  
2) Growth opportunities 
Growth opportunities (GROWTH), measured by market to book value of 
assets, is found to have an inverse influence on the debt level of listed 
Vietnamese firms. Firms having larger growth opportunities will borrow less. This 
finding is supported by trade-off theory in that firms having higher growth 
opportunities bear higher financial distress costs and have less free cash flow that 
could cause agency problems, so therefore they are less levered (Myers, 1977). 
Also, firms with more growth opportunities need higher flexibility in decision-
making, without the constraints imposed on them by debt holders in debt 
covenants, in order to for them to use less debt.  
This study provides similar findings to those of Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Titman and Wessels (1988), Bauer (2004), Frank and Goyal (2009), Nunkoo and 
Boateng (2010) with regard to the negative relationship between growth 




However, as capital expenditure (CAPEX) is another proxy for growth 
opportunities, it provides the contradictory result of a positive relationship 
between capital expenditure and leverage. This could be explained by the 
assertion that growth firms with increasing capital expenditure need more 
external financing, i.e. debt on priority – according to pecking order theory.  
3) Industry mean leverage 
The study also finds evidence of the impact of industry mean leverage 
(INDLEV) on firm leverage for book value leverage ratios. This is consistent with 
literature contending that firms follow industry mean leverage in their capital 
structure decisions, as demonstrated by Bradley et al. (1984), Harris and Raviv 
(1995), Long and Malitz (1985), Frank and Goyal (2009), Bauer (2004), and, 
especially, Chi (2013) for Vietnamese firms.  
4) Industry classification 
Table 20 and 21 show that whether or not firms belong to highly regulated 
industry, with dummy variable INDCL, affects capital structure decision. While 
firms in regulated industries have lower debt when leverage is measured by Total 
Debt to Market or Book Value of Capital (TDM or TDC), they have higher leverage 
in terms of long-term debt to market value of capital.  This suggests that firms in 
strictly regulated industries tend to borrow more heavily in the long-term than 
firms in the other category. This is due to the fact that strictly regulated firms are 
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likely to be subjected to fewer risks and have a better ability to pay long-term 
debt.  
In addition to Construction, Construction Materials, and Real Estate 
industries, and Minerals industry, the industry dummy for Manufacturing, Steel, 
Plastics and Packaging industries (INDCL4) is also found to have a significant 
influence on leverage to a moderate extent. This suggests that firms belonging to 
Manufacturing, Steel, and Plastics and Packaging industries are also more levered. 
However, this finding is only confirmed when measuring leverage with market 
value of capital.  
5) Uniqueness 
This study reveals that selling, general & administration expenses (SGA), as 
a proxy for the uniqueness of assets, positively influences long-term debt ratios. 
Although this finding conflicts with the theoretical prediction that firms having 
more unique assets will face higher financial distress costs, and thus – use less 
debt – it agrees with Titman and Wessels (1988) on the existence of an inverse 
relationship between uniqueness and leverage. This research provides the first 
study of uniqueness for Vietnamese firms. In general, with the exception of only 
few large firms, Vietnamese firms do not make much R&D expenditures, so SGA is 




6) Average lending rate 
Average lending rate, as a proxy for debt market condition, has an unclear 
impact on leverage, by showing positive impact on Total Debt to Market Value of 
Capital (TDM) but negative impact on Long-term Debt to Book Value of Capital 
(LDC) for Vietnamese listed firms. The former impact can be explained by the 
claim made by trade-off theory that when lending rate increases, firms can also 
borrow more to benefit from interest tax shields. The latter impact can be 
explained by the claim that firms will borrow less when the cost of funds is higher 
– especially for long-term debt which is more costly than short-term debt.  
The financial market condition in Vietnam during the period of 2009-2013 
was complex. In 2010 and 2011, inflation rates went up to 11.75% and 18.13%. 
Due to the economic recession during these two years, and the fact that market 
nominal interest rates go up when inflation rates rise, the average lending rates 
were very high as well. Firms were in need of more capital to fund their 
operations and create competitive advantage to survive in the recession.  
Consequently, they increased their borrowing even though the cost of funds was 






Group 3: Irrelevant factors 
This study reveals that no significant relationship exists between industry 
classification and leverage for firms in Petroleum, Energy, Electricity, and Gas 
(INDCL1), and Service, Tourism and Commerce (INDCL5) industries. 
The study also concludes that average tax rate (TAX), as a proxy for taxes, 
and non-debt tax shields (DEPR, or depreciation expense/total assets) have no 
relationship with leverage for Vietnamese listed firms. This finding is in 
disagreement with trade-off theory which contends that the higher the tax firms 
pay, the higher the value of the debt tax shields firms can gain. The findings of 
this study assert that non-debt tax shields have a negative relationship with 
leverage because they act as substitutes for interest tax shields. This study also 
contradicts the empirical findings of Bauer (2004), Huang and Song (2002), and 






CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY OF THE STUDY 
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This research studies publicly traded, non-financial Vietnamese firms over 
the period 2009 to 2013 to determine which factors have a reliable influence on 
market-based leverage. The sample consists of 183 firms on two stock exchanges 
(HOSE and HNX). The study bases itself upon four leverage measures and 
nineteen potential capital structure determinants, including six industry 
dummies, in order to gage the impact these factors have on firm leverage.  
The study reveals that most of the factors have statistically significant 
influence on leverage measures to a certain extent. The most reliable and 
influential factors that explain the capital structure decisions of Vietnamese listed 
firms are: firm size; tangibility of assets; inflation rate, as a proxy for 
macroeconomic condition; business risk; stock market return, as a proxy for stock 
market condition; industry classifications for Construction, Construction 
Materials, and Real Estate industries and Mineral industry. The moderate 
influential factors include: profitability; growth opportunities; industry mean 
leverage; average ending rate, as a proxy for debt market condition; uniqueness; 
industry classification for regulated industry and Manufacturing, Steel, Plastics 
and Packaging industries.  The study finds no evidence of the industry differences 
of firms belonging to Petroleum, and Energy, Electricity, and Gas industries and 
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Service and Tourism and Commerce industries, as well as the impact of average 
tax rate and depreciation expense, as a proxy for non-debt tax shields, on the 
leverage of Vietnamese listed firms.  
The impacts by the most important factors are specified as follows. 
 Larger firms tend to have higher leverage. Larger and older firms have better 
access to debt markets, i.e. bank loans and corporate bond issuance. This 
supports the prediction made by trade-off theory and pecking order theory. 
 Firms having more tangible assets tend to have higher leverage. According to 
trade-off theory, higher tangibility makes borrowing easier because these 
firms possess more collateral and less financial distress costs. According to 
agency theory, this reduces agency problems by preventing assets 
substitution.  
 When the inflation rate is expected to be high, firms tend to have higher 
leverage. According to trade-off theory, tax advantage is more valuable when 
inflation is high. Also, according to market timing theory, inflation leads to a 
lower real cost of debt.  
 Firms subjected to higher business risk tend to have higher leverage. This 
confirms the argument made by pecking order theory that firms with more 
risky earnings have higher levels of information asymmetry, and therefore 
have more debt. 
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 When stock market return is high, firms tend to have higher leverage.  
 Firms belonging to Construction, Construction Materials, and Real Estate 
industries and Minerals industries borrow more than others. These firms have 
a high need for capital due to the high level of investment in fixed assets.  
The impacts of the moderately important factors are specified as follows.  
 Firms that are more profitable tend to have lower leverage, in terms of total 
debt to market value or book value of capital. Profitable firms have more 
retained earnings, and therefore have less demand for external financing. This 
is consistent with pecking order theory. However, profitability does not affect 
the use of long-term debt. 
 Firms having higher market to book value, or growth opportunities, tend to 
have lower leverage, yet this only holds for leverage measures in market 
value. Growth firms bear higher financial distress costs, have less free cash 
flow, have less agency problems, and need more flexibility – so they are less 
levered, according to trade-off theory and agency theory. 
 Firms having higher capital expenditure, another proxy for growth 
opportunities, tend to have higher leverage. This supports pecking order 
theory as firms with increasing capital expenditure need more external 
financing and prefer debt.  
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 Firms follow industry average leverage in choosing their debt level, when 
leverage is defined as total debt or long-term debt to book value of capital.  
 Firms belonging to highly regulated industries have lower leverage in terms of 
total debt measures, but higher leverage when measured by long-term debt 
to market value of capital. These firms tend to borrow more heavily in the 
long-term as they are likely to shoulder less risk and have a better ability to 
pay long-term debt.  
 Firms belonging to Manufacturing, Steel, Plastics and Packaging industries 
have higher leverage than others, in terms of debt to market value of capital. 
These firms have high levels of investment in fixed assets.  
 Firms with higher selling, general & administration expenses, as a proxy for 
uniqueness of assets, tend to have higher leverage. When average lending 
rate on the market – a proxy for debt market condition, is high – firms tend to 
have higher total debt to market value of capital, while at the same time 
having lower long-term debt to book value of capital. This implies that firms 
borrow less long-term debt and more short-term debt when lending rates 
increase. Firms have better access to short-term rather than long-term loans 
and lower borrowing costs.  
This study agrees with certain findings that have been proposed by various 
studies carried out in Vietnam, still it brings about a number of new perspectives 
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on the subject. In accordance with Chi (2013), this study also demonstrates the 
impact of profitability (ROA), growth opportunities (market to book value of 
assets ratio), and inflation on leverage. Both studies have revealed an inverse 
relationship between profitability and leverage, and market to book ratio and 
leverage. The two studies, however, disagree on whether the relationship 
between leverage and inflation is positive or negative. The findings in this study 
show relevance to market timing theories, suggesting the relationship between 
leverage and inflation is a positive one. On the contrary, the results of Chi (2013) 
support the pecking-order theory that inflation has a negative influence on 
leverage. In comparison to Chi (2013), the research in this study has been 
conducted on a larger scale, incorporating a greater number of observations 
conducted over a longer and more recent time period.  
With respect to the study by Anh and Yen (2014) which focuses only HOSE 
firms, this research covers a broader spectrum of firms from both stock 
exchanges (HOSE and HNX), providing the study with a larger data set, and longer 
time horizon. Using the similar methodology of fixed-effects regression model, 
Anh and Yen (2014) concluded that firm size and profitability determine capital 
structure, and these factors are also among the results in this study. Although 
both studies show a positive relationship between firm size and leverage, they 
are in conflict over the impact of profitability on leverage. In contrast to Anh and 
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Yen (2004) who identified taxes as one of the key determinants of capital 
structure, this study does not find taxes to have any significant influence on 
leverage.  
Although the study conducted by Phi Anh (2010) used a different 
methodology, this study shares the same conclusion that business risk, tangibility 
(asset structure), firm size, and profitability are factors influencing debt ratio. The 
two studies are also similar in concluding a negative influence of profitability and 
positive influence of firm size, but in conflict over the influence of tangibility.  
The analysis in this study has largely rested on the well-known capital 
structure theories as presented in Chapter 3: trade-off theory, agency theory, 
free cash flow theory, pecking order theory, and market timing theories. This 
study has leveraged on the four most popular capital structure theories to explain 
the results. It can be seen that the capital structure decisions in Vietnamese firms 
have been partly following the classic theories that explain capital structure 
decisions in other countries. However, in an emerging and developing economy, 
the capital structure decisions of Vietnamese firms have not been rationalized to 
follow a clear approach. Thus, the impacts of such factors as stock market return 
and average lending rate are not well-supported by capital structure theories in 
the case of Vietnam.  
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In conclusion, this paper provides a more comprehensive study of capital 
structure of Vietnamese listed firms than current empirical studies, and 
significantly contributes to the literature. This study utilizes a larger sample of 
firms and a longer time period, making for a much larger set of observations. It 
also studies firms on the two stock exchanges. As well, the use of panel data and 
advanced econometrics methods are highly notable. More importantly, the study 
includes most of the determinants of capital structure as suggested by previous 
theoretical and empirical researchers, internationally and in Vietnam. The study is 
highly relevant in for Vietnamese firms, because it uses updated data in the most 
recent time, and looks at the capital market after government deregulation and 
after the market collapse in 2008.  
B. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Firstly, despite having a large data set, the study fails to include some 
relevant factors that were proposed by some previous studies, such as manager 
behaviors and state ownership. If these factors are incorporated in this study, the 
analysis will be more comprehensive. In addition, the study could also have 
included more measures of the factors being studied, such as industry average 
growth rate as a proxy for industry condition, and growth in GDP as a proxy for 
macroeconomic condition. The reason this study does not include such factors is 
due to limited availability of databases and the long process involved in collecting 
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data from diverse and un-unified sources for data in the case of state ownership 
and manager behaviors.  
Secondly, although the five-year period provides a longer time series than 
most other Vietnamese capital structure research projects, this is still a short time 
period relative to the credible studies worldwide, such as Frank and Goyal (2009) 
who study spans over a 50-year horizon. Considering only a five-year period 
during which there were many notable changes in macroeconomics and business 
environments is likely to affect the reliability of the results. 
Thirdly, the analysis of capital structure theories needs to be improved. 
The study has not examined the relation of capital structure decisions to trade-off 
theories, agency theory, free cash flow theory, pecking order theory, and market 
timing theory, which was done briefly in Chi (2013).  
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Followings are some suggestions for future research in the field to improve 
upon this study. Firstly, it is necessary to use a more complete set of capital 
structure factors. As mentioned above, factors such as manager behaviors and 
state ownership should also be considered in the analysis. Secondly, it is possible 
to expand the time horizon of the study. The stock exchanges in Vietnam began 
operating in 2000 and 2006, allowing researchers to collect a broader range of 
data in a longer time period. Thirdly, clarifying the application of the four capital 
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structure theories in capital structure decisions of Vietnamese firms is also 
important. Proper methods and analysis can be used to achieve this. Fourthly, it is 
important to study the capital structure determinants for specific industries 
separately in order to understand the capital structure behaviors pertaining to 
each industry and to remove the industry difference that may provide biased 
results. Despite the fact that industry dummies are included in this study, it is not 
sufficient to allow the identification of relevant factors that influence capital 
structure firms within an industry. There were studies done previously for 
manufacturing companies in Vietnam, but those are weak in methodology and 
not persuasive in their analysis. Finally, it is practical to investigate the changes in 
capital structure decisions and determinants before and after privatization of 
Vietnamese (listed and non-listed) firms. As mentioned above, a large number of 
Vietnamese firms were state-owned before the privatization process was widely 
implemented. It is possible to apply statistical tests and econometric methods to 
identify the difference before and after such changes, despite the fact that data 
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Appendix 1: Fixed-effects regression with TDM on all factors except dummies 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs        =       915 
Group variable: code                                    Number of groups   =     183   
              
R-sq:  within  = 0.4066                                  Obs per group: min =         5   
       between = 0.1700                                     avg =       5.0     
       overall = 0.1916                                        max =         5     
                                                                     F(13,719)          =     37.89   
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.5888                            Prob > F           =    0.0000   
  
TDM Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
RISK -0.3040 0.2304 -1.32 0.1870 -0.7562 0.1482 
ROA -0.7047 0.1170 -6.02 0.0000 -0.9344 -0.4749 
SIZE 0.4865 0.0547 8.90 0.0000 0.3792 0.5939 
GROWTH -0.1457 0.0175 -8.31 0.0000 -0.1801 -0.1113 
CAPEX 0.0438 0.0567 0.77 0.4400 -0.0676 0.1552 
TANG 0.1407 0.0632 2.23 0.0260 0.0167 0.2647 
SGA 0.0009 0.0531 0.02 0.9870 -0.1035 0.1052 
TAX -0.0395 0.0290 -1.36 0.1730 -0.0964 0.0174 
DEPR 0.3730 0.4236 0.88 0.3790 -0.4585 1.2046 
INDLEV 0.2315 0.1479 1.56 0.1180 -0.0589 0.5220 
STOCKMRT 0.1539 0.0357 4.31 0.0000 0.0838 0.2240 
LENDRT 1.3964 0.2586 5.40 0.0000 0.8886 1.9042 
INFLATION 1.0352 0.1927 5.37 0.0000 0.6570 1.4134 
_cons -2.6825 0.3193 -8.40 0.0000 -3.3094 -2.0555 
              
sigma_u 0.28239           
sigma_e 0.12024           
rho 0.84652 (fraction of variance due to u_i)   
              








Appendix 2: Random-effects regression with TDM on all factors except dummies 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs        =       915 
Group variable: code                                      Number of groups   =       183   
              
R-sq:  within  = 0.3798                         Obs per group: min =         5   
       between = 0.3271                                        avg =       5.0     
       overall = 0.3392                                        max =         5     
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian             Wald chi2(13)      =    526.13 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000   
              
TDM Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Intervals] 
RISK -0.4239 0.2256 -1.88 0.0600 -0.8661 0.0183 
ROA -0.7573 0.1116 -6.78 0.0000 -0.9761 -0.5385 
SIZE 0.1980 0.0241 8.21 0.0000 0.1507 0.2452 
GROWTH -0.1424 0.0173 -8.25 0.0000 -0.1762 -0.1086 
CAPEX 0.0666 0.0569 1.17 0.2410 -0.0448 0.1781 
TANG 0.1185 0.0523 2.26 0.0240 0.0159 0.2210 
SGA -0.0649 0.0523 -1.24 0.2150 -0.1673 0.0376 
TAX -0.0397 0.0293 -1.36 0.1750 -0.0971 0.0177 
DEPR 0.7086 0.3372 2.10 0.0360 0.0476 1.3696 
INDLEV 0.5569 0.0964 5.78 0.0000 0.3680 0.7458 
STOCKMRT 0.1069 0.0359 2.98 0.0030 0.0366 0.1772 
LENDRT 1.5737 0.2572 6.12 0.0000 1.0696 2.0778 
INFLATION 0.7505 0.1914 3.92 0.0000 0.3754 1.1257 
_cons -1.1799 0.1543 -7.65 0.0000 -1.4824 -0.8774 
              
sigma_u 0.18267           
sigma_e 0.12024           










Appendix 3:  Hausman test results for TDM models 
Coefficients ----           
  (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
  fem1 rem1 Difference S.E. 
 
  
              
RISK -0.3040 -0.4239 0.1199 0.0722     
ROA -0.7047 -0.7573 0.0526 0.0450     
SIZE 0.4865 0.1980 0.2886 0.0508     
GROWTH -0.1457 -0.1424 -0.0033 0.0052     
CAPEX 0.0438 0.0666 -0.0228 0.0132     
TANG 0.1407 0.1185 0.0222 0.0385     
SGA 0.0009 -0.0649 0.0657 0.0159     
TAX -0.0395 -0.0397 0.0002 0.0055     
DEPR 0.3730 0.7086 -0.3356 0.2757     
INDLEV 0.2315 0.5569 -0.3253 0.1177     
STOCKMRT 0.1539 0.1069 0.0470 0.0079     
LENDRT 1.3964 1.5737 -0.1773 0.0678     
INFLATION 1.0352 0.7505 0.2847 0.0512     
              
            b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
              
 Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic     
              
 chi2(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)       
                =       58.55         
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000         











Appendix 4:  Fixed-effects regression with TDC on all factors except dummies 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs        =       915   
Group variable: code                                    Number of groups   =       183   
              
R-sq:  within  = 0.2406                                  Obs per group: min =       5   
       between = 0.1973                                     avg =       5.0     
       overall = 0.1893                                        max =         5     
                                                                 F(13,719)          =     17.53   
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6415                        Prob > F           =    
0.0000     
              
TDC Coef. Std. Err. t P> t [95% Conf. Interval] 
RISK 0.2962 0.1756 1.69 0.0920 -0.0486 0.6409 
ROA -0.4763 0.0892 -5.34 0.0000 -0.6514 -0.3012 
SIZE 0.4589 0.0417 11.01 0.0000 0.3770 0.5407 
GROWTH -0.0201 0.0134 -1.50 0.1330 -0.0463 0.0062 
CAPEX 0.0678 0.0433 1.57 0.1180 -0.0171 0.1527 
TANG 0.1537 0.0481 3.19 0.0010 0.0591 0.2482 
SGA 0.0553 0.0405 1.36 0.1730 -0.0242 0.1348 
TAX -0.0193 0.0221 -0.88 0.3820 -0.0627 0.0240 
DEPR -0.1171 0.3229 -0.36 0.7170 -0.7510 0.5168 
INDLEV 0.2118 0.1128 1.88 0.0610 -0.0096 0.4332 
STOCKMRT 0.0591 0.0272 2.17 0.0300 0.0057 0.1126 
LENDRT -0.2882 0.1972 -1.46 0.1440 -0.6753 0.0989 
INFLATION 0.4370 0.1469 2.98 0.0030 0.1486 0.7253 
_cons -2.4313 0.2434 -9.99 0.0000 -2.9092 -1.9534 
              
sigma_u 0.2530242           
sigma_e 0.0916566           
Rho 0.8840006  (fraction of variance due to u_i)   
              








Appendix 5:  Random-effects regression with TDC on all factors except dummies 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs        =       915   
Group variable: code                                      Number of groups   =       183   
              
R-sq:  within  = 0.2064                         Obs per group: min =         5   
       between = 0.2787                                        avg =       5.0     
       overall = 0.2638                                            max =         5     
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(13)      =    246.58   
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                      Prob > chi2        =    0.0000   
              
TDC Coef. Std. Err. z    P>z 
 
[95% Conf. Interval] 
RISK 0.1786 0.1754 1.02 0.3090 -0.1653 0.5224 
ROA -0.5195 0.0873 -5.95 0.0000 -0.6907 -0.3483 
SIZE 0.2190 0.0211 10.39 0.0000 0.1777 0.2603 
GROWTH -0.0186 0.0134 -1.39 0.1660 -0.0448 0.0077 
CAPEX 0.0900 0.0439 2.05 0.0400 0.0039 0.1761 
TANG 0.1369 0.0422 3.24 0.0010 0.0542 0.2197 
SGA 0.0084 0.0406 0.21 0.8360 -0.0712 0.0880 
TAX -0.0180 0.0226 -0.80 0.4260 -0.0623 0.0263 
DEPR 0.1787 0.2738 0.65 0.5140 -0.3579 0.7153 
INDLEV 0.4213 0.0811 5.20 0.0000 0.2624 0.5802 
STOCKMRT 0.0216 0.0276 0.78 0.4340 -0.0325 0.0757 
LENDRT -0.1203 0.1983 -0.61 0.5440 -0.5089 0.2683 
INFLATION 0.2069 0.1474 1.40 0.1600 -0.0820 0.4958 
_cons -1.1522 0.1326 -8.69 0.0000 -1.4122 -0.8922 
              
sigma_u 0.166592           
sigma_e 0.0916566           










Appendix 6: Hausman test results for TDC models 
Coefficients ----         
  (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
  fem2 rem2 Difference S.E.   
            
RISK 0.2962 0.1786 0.1176 0.0478   
ROA -0.4763 -0.5195 0.0432 0.0301   
SIZE 0.4589 0.2190 0.2398 0.0377   
GROWTH -0.0201 -0.0186 -0.0015 0.0034   
CAPEX 0.0678 0.0900 -0.0222 0.0088   
TANG 0.1537 0.1369 0.0167 0.0265   
SGA 0.0553 0.0084 0.0469 0.0106   
TAX -0.0193 -0.0180 -0.0013 0.0036   
DEPR -0.1171 0.1787 -0.2958 0.1920   
INDLEV 0.2118 0.4213 -0.2095 0.0840   
STOCKMRT 0.0591 0.0216 0.0375 0.0058   
LENDRT -0.2882 -0.1203 -0.1679 0.0488   
INFLATION 0.4370 0.2069 0.2300 0.0375   
            
            b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
            
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic   
            
 chi2(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)     
                          =       70.23       
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000       











Appendix 7:  Fixed-effects regression with LDM on all factors except dummies 
Fixed-effects (within) regression              Number of obs         =       915 
Group variable: code                                    Number of groups   =       183   
              
R-sq:  within  = 0.1779                         Obs per group: min =         5   
       between = 0.4691                                        avg =       5.0     
       overall = 0.4209                                        max =         5     
                                                                 F(13,719)          =     11.96     
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1423                         Prob > F           =    0.0000   
              
LDM Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
RISK 0.4435 0.1547 2.87 0.0040 0.1398 0.7472 
ROA -0.1038 0.0786 -1.32 0.1870 -0.2581 0.0505 
SIZE 0.1321 0.0367 3.60 0.0000 0.0601 0.2042 
GROWTH -0.0522 0.0118 -4.44 0.0000 -0.0753 -0.0291 
CAPEX 0.0767 0.0381 2.01 0.0450 0.0018 0.1515 
TANG 0.2978 0.0424 7.02 0.0000 0.2145 0.3811 
SGA 0.1594 0.0357 4.47 0.0000 0.0893 0.2295 
TAX -0.0220 0.0195 -1.13 0.2590 -0.0602 0.0162 
DEPR 0.1703 0.2844 0.60 0.5500 -0.3882 0.7287 
INDLEV 0.1060 0.0994 1.07 0.2870 -0.0891 0.3010 
STOCKMRT 0.0407 0.0240 1.70 0.0900 -0.0064 0.0878 
LENDRT -0.1539 0.1737 -0.89 0.3760 -0.4950 0.1871 
INFLATION 0.4523 0.1294 3.50 0.0010 0.1983 0.7063 
_cons -0.7716 0.2145 -3.60 0.0000 -1.1926 -0.3506 
              
sigma_u 0.132547           
sigma_e 0.080748           
rho 0.729324 (fraction of variance due to u_i)   
              









Appendix 8:  Random-effects regression with LDM on all factors except dummies 
Random-effects GLS regression             Number of obs        =       915 
Group variable: code                                Number of groups   =       183   
              
R-sq:  within  = 0.1693                         Obs per group: min =         5   
       between = 0.5355                                 avg =       5.0     
       overall = 0.4742                                    max =         5     
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(13)      =    359.05 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                       Prob > chi2        =    0.0000   
              
LDM Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
RISK 0.3214 0.1484 2.17 0.0300 0.0305 0.6123 
ROA -0.1755 0.0732 -2.40 0.0170 -0.3189 -0.0320 
SIZE 0.1195 0.0149 7.99 0.0000 0.0902 0.1488 
GROWTH -0.0551 0.0114 -4.84 0.0000 -0.0774 -0.0328 
CAPEX 0.0812 0.0376 2.16 0.0310 0.0076 0.1548 
TANG 0.3493 0.0337 10.36 0.0000 0.2832 0.4154 
SGA 0.1277 0.0344 3.71 0.0000 0.0602 0.1952 
TAX -0.0231 0.0194 -1.19 0.2340 -0.0610 0.0149 
DEPR 0.6554 0.2167 3.03 0.0020 0.2308 1.0800 
INDLEV 0.2373 0.0608 3.90 0.0000 0.1181 0.3564 
STOCKMRT 0.0335 0.0238 1.41 0.1590 -0.0131 0.0801 
LENDRT -0.2137 0.1702 -1.26 0.2090 -0.5472 0.1199 
INFLATION 0.4496 0.1267 3.55 0.0000 0.2013 0.6980 
_cons -0.7804 0.0966 -8.08 0.0000 -0.9697 -0.5910 
              
sigma_u 0.112086           
sigma_e 0.080748           










Appendix 9: Hausman Test results for LDM models 
Coefficients ----           
  (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b V_B))   
  fem3 rem3 Difference S.E.     
              
RISK 0.4435 0.3214 0.1221 0.0437     
ROA -0.1038 -0.1755 0.0717 0.0286     
SIZE 0.1321 0.1195 0.0127 0.0335     
GROWTH -0.0522 -0.0551 0.0029 0.0030     
CAPEX 0.0767 0.0812 -0.0045 0.0065     
TANG 0.2978 0.3493 -0.0515 0.0257     
SGA 0.1594 0.1277 0.0317 0.0094     
TAX -0.0220 -0.0231 0.0011 0.0019     
DEPR 0.1703 0.6554 -0.4851 0.1843     
INDLEV 0.1060 0.2373 -0.1313 0.0786     
STOCKMRT 0.0407 0.0335 0.0072 0.0032     
LENDRT -0.1539 -0.2137 0.0597 0.0347     
INFLATION 0.4523 0.4496 0.0027 0.0261     
  
 
b =     consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg   
B =     inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
              
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic   
    chi2(13) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)   
    54.2         
    Prob>chi2 =      0.0000     











Appendix 10:  Fixed-effects regression with LDC on all factors except for dummies 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs         =       915 
Group variable: code                                     Number of groups   =       183 
            
R-sq:  within  = 0.2048                         Obs per group: min =         5 
       between = 0.4693                                        avg =       5.0 
       overall = 0.4288                                        max =         5   
                                                                 F(13,719)          =     14.24   
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1725                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
            
LDC Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
RISK 0.4798 0.1223 3.92 0.0000 0.2398 0.7199 
ROA -0.0534 0.0621 -0.86 0.3900 -0.1753 0.0686 
SIZE 0.1057 0.0290 3.64 0.0000 0.0487 0.1626 
GROWTH -0.0151 0.0093 -1.62 0.1050 -0.0334 0.0032 
CAPEX 0.0848 0.0301 2.82 0.0050 0.0257 0.1439 
TANG 0.2652 0.0335 7.91 0.0000 0.1994 0.3310 
SGA 0.1613 0.0282 5.72 0.0000 0.1059 0.2166 
TAX -0.0155 0.0154 -1.01 0.3150 -0.0457 0.0147 
DEPR -0.2463 0.2248 -1.10 0.2740 -0.6877 0.1950 
INDLEV 0.1506 0.0785 1.92 0.0550 -0.0035 0.3048 
STOCKMRT 0.0259 0.0190 1.37 0.1720 -0.0113 0.0631 
LENDRT -0.4669 0.1373 -3.40 0.0010 -0.7365 -0.1974 
INFLATION 0.2942 0.1023 2.88 0.0040 0.0935 0.4950 
_cons -0.6222 0.1695 -3.67 0.0000 -0.9550 -0.2895 
              
sigma_u 0.113513           
sigma_e 0.06382           
Rho 0.75982 (fraction of variance due to u_i)   
              









Appendix 11:  Random-effects regression with LDC on all factors except dummies 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       915 
Group variable: code                                      Number of groups   =       183 
              
R-sq:  within  = 0.1954                         Obs per group: min =         5   
       between = 0.5262                                        avg =       5.0   
       overall = 0.4762                                        max =         5     
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                Wald chi2(13)      =    384.19 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                  Prob > chi2        =    0.0000   
              
LDC Coef. Std.Err. Z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
RISK 0.4022 0.1185 3.39 0.0010 0.1700 0.6344 
ROA -0.1128 0.0586 -1.92 0.0540 -0.2276 0.0021 
SIZE 0.1120 0.0125 8.94 0.0000 0.0875 0.1366 
GROWTH -0.0173 0.0091 -1.91 0.0560 -0.0351 0.0005 
CAPEX 0.0886 0.0299 2.97 0.0030 0.0301 0.1472 
TANG 0.3046 0.0274 11.12 0.0000 0.2509 0.3583 
SGA 0.1365 0.0275 4.97 0.0000 0.0826 0.1903 
TAX -0.0167 0.0154 -1.08 0.2780 -0.0469 0.0135 
DEPR 0.2228 0.1764 1.26 0.2070 -0.1230 0.5686 
INDLEV 0.2133 0.0503 4.24 0.0000 0.1148 0.3118 
STOCKMRT 0.0234 0.0189 1.24 0.2150 -0.0136 0.0604 
LENDRT -0.5172 0.1352 -3.83 0.0000 -0.7822 -0.2522 
INFLATION 0.3111 0.1006 3.09 0.0020 0.1139 0.5083 
_cons -0.7054 0.0804 -8.78 0.0000 -0.8630 -0.5479 
              
sigma_u 0.095522           
sigma_e 0.06382           










Appendix 12:  Hausman test results for LDC models 
Coefficients ----           
  (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b  V_B))   
  fem4 rem4 Difference S.E.     
              
RISK    0.4798 0.4022 0.0776 0.0302     
ROA -0.0534 -0.1128 0.0594 0.0206     
SIZE 0.1057 0.1120 -0.0064 0.0262     
GROWTH -0.0151 -0.0173 0.0022 0.0021     
CAPEX 0.0848 0.0886 -0.0038 0.0038     
TANG 0.2652 0.3046 -0.0394 0.0193     
SGA 0.1613 0.1365 0.0248 0.0064     
TAX -0.0155 -0.0167 0.0012 .     
DEPR -0.2463 0.2228 -0.4691 0.1393     
INDLEV 0.1506 0.2133 -0.0626 0.0603     
STOCKMRT 0.0259 0.0234 0.0025 0.0019     
LENDRT -0.4669 -0.5172 0.0503 0.0238     
INFLATION 0.2942 0.3111 -0.0169 0.0182     
              
            b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
              
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic   
              
 chi2(13) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)       
                          =       97.33         
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000         











Appendix 13: Fixed-effects regression with TDM and selected factors 
Fixed-effects (within) regression          Number of obs        =       915 
Group variable: code                               Number of groups   =       183   
              
R-sq:  within  = 0.4009                         Obs per group: min =         5   
       between = 0.1359                                        avg =       5.0     
       overall = 0.1601                                        max =         5     
              
                                                          F(7,725)           =     69.30     
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6078                Prob > F           =    0.0000   
              
TDM Coef. Std. Err.      t    P>t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
ROA -0.7432 0.1122 -6.6200 0.0000 -0.9635 -0.5229 
SIZE 0.4976 0.0535 9.3000 0.0000 0.3926 0.6027 
GROWTH -0.1450 0.0175 -8.3000 0.0000 -0.1793 -0.1107 
TANG 0.1567 0.0592 2.6500 0.0080 0.0406 0.2728 
STOCKMRT 0.1699 0.0351 4.8400 0.0000 0.1010 0.2388 
LENDRT 1.4730 0.2526 5.8300 0.0000 0.9770 1.9690 
INFLATION 1.0786 0.1900 5.6800 0.0000 0.7056 1.4515 
_cons -2.6350 0.3130 -8.4200 0.0000 -3.2494 -2.0205 
              
sigma_u 0.29389           
sigma_e 0.12031           
Rho 0.85646 (fraction of variance due to u_i)   
              











Appendix 14: Fixed-effects regression with TDC and selected factors 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs        =       915   
Group variable: code                                    Number of groups   =       183   
              
R-sq:  within  = 0.2307            Obs per group: min =        5     
       between = 0.2008                                        avg =       5.0     
       overall = 0.1916                                        max =         5     
              
                                                F(7,725)           =     31.06       
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6309      Prob > F           =    0.0000     
TDC Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]   
RISK 0.3067 0.1749 1.7500 0.0800 -0.0367 0.6502 
ROA -0.5055 0.0862 -5.8700 0.0000 -0.6746 -0.3363 
SIZE 0.4481 0.0407 11.0100 0.0000 0.3682 0.5280 
TANG 0.1593 0.0449 3.5500 0.0000 0.0712 0.2475 
INDLEV 0.1889 0.1107 1.7100 0.0880 -0.0285 0.4063 
STOCKMRT 0.0876 0.0197 4.4400 0.0000 0.0488 0.1263 
INFLATION 0.5484 0.1357 4.0400 0.0000 0.2820 0.8147 
_cons -2.4275 0.2404 -10.1000 0.0000 -2.8995 -1.9555 
              
sigma_u 0.2495           
sigma_e 0.091872           
rho 0.8805699 (fraction of variance due to   u_i)   
              












Appendix 15: Fixed-effects regression with LDM and selected factors 
Fixed-effects (within) regression           Number of obs        =       915 
Group variable: code                                Number of groups   =       183   
              
R-sq:  within  = 0.1723                         Obs per group: min =         5   
       between = 0.4202                                 avg =       5.0     
       overall = 0.3795                                    max =         5     
              
                                                      F(8,724)           =     18.85     
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0982              Prob > F           =    0.0000   
              
LDM Coef. Std. Err.         t P>t            [95% Conf. Interval] 
RISK 0.4127 0.1528 2.7 0.0070 0.1128 0.7127 
SIZE 0.1327 0.0350 3.79 0.0000 0.0639 0.2014 
GROWTH -0.0528 0.0114   -4.62 0.0000 -0.0752 -0.0304 
CAPEX 0.0733 0.0374 1.96 0.0500 -0.0000 0.1467 
TANG 0.3076 0.0414 7.43 0.0000 0.2263 0.3889 
SGA 0.1748 0.0347 5.04 0.0000 0.1067 0.2429 
STOCKMRT 0.0525 0.0174 3.02 0.0030 0.0183 0.0867 
INFLATION 0.4635 0.1165 3.98 0.0000 0.2348 0.6922 
_cons -0.7471 0.2100 -3.56 0.0000 -1.1594 -0.3348 
              
sigma_u 0.137702           
sigma_e 0.080738           
Rho 0.74417 (fraction of variance due to u_i)   
              











Appendix 16: Fixed-effects regression with LDC and selected factors 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       915 
Group variable: code                                    Number of groups   =       183 
              
R-sq:  within  = 0.1961                         Obs per group: min =         5   
       between = 0.4819                                        avg =       5.0   
       overall = 0.4380                                        max =         5     
              
                                                  F(8,724)           =     22.08     
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1890          Prob > F           =    0.0000   
              
LDC Coef. Std. Err. t             P>t           [95% Conf. Interval] 
RISK 0.4572 0.1209 3.7800 0.0000 0.2199 0.6945 
SIZE 0.0977 0.0281 3.4700 0.0010 0.0424 0.1529 
CAPEX 0.0874 0.0296 2.9500 0.0030 0.0292 0.1455 
TANG 0.2572 0.0327 7.8600 0.0000 0.1929 0.3214 
SGA 0.1701 0.0275 6.1900 0.0000 0.1161 0.2241 
INDLEV 0.1733 0.0772 2.2400 0.0250 0.0217 0.3248 
LENDRT -0.5456 0.0969 -5.6300 0.0000 -0.7357 -0.3554 
INFLATION 0.1781 0.0560 3.1800 0.0020 0.0682 0.2880 
_cons -0.5906 0.1585 -3.7300 0.0000 -0.9017 -0.2795 
              
sigma_u 0.112536           
sigma_e 0.063945           
Rho 0.755934 (fraction of variance due to u_i)   
              











Appendix 17: Pooled OLS regression with TDM and all factors 
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 915 
        F( 19,   895) = 35.35 
Model 30.6545 19 1.6134 Prob > F = 0.0000 
Residual 40.8478 895 0.0456 R-squared = 0.4287 
    
  
Adj R-squared = 0.4166 
Total 71.5022 914 0.0782 Root MSE = 0.21364 
              
TDM Coef. Std. Err. T P>t [95% Conf. Interval]  
RISK -0.6135 0.2774 -2.2100 0.0270 -1.1579 -0.0692 
ROA -1.0079 0.1315 -7.6600 0.0000 -1.2660 -0.7497 
SIZE 0.1522 0.0142 10.7000 0.0000 0.1243 0.1801 
GROWTH -0.0945 0.0227 -4.1600 0.0000 -0.1391 -0.0499 
CAPEX -0.0159 0.0851 -0.1900 0.8520 -0.1829 0.1511 
TANG 0.1225 0.0457 2.6800 0.0070 0.0328 0.2123 
SGA -0.3727 0.0684 -5.4500 0.0000 -0.5070 -0.2384 
TAX -0.0764 0.0436 -1.7500 0.0800 -0.1620 0.0092 
DEPR 1.2796 0.3452 3.7100 0.0000 0.6021 1.9572 
INDLEV 0.5381 0.0929 5.7900 0.0000 0.3558 0.7204 
INDCL -0.0409 0.0210 -1.9400 0.0520 -0.0822 0.0004 
INDCL1 -0.0343 0.0282 -1.2200 0.2240 -0.0896 0.0210 
INDCL2 0.1194 0.0579 2.0600 0.0390 0.0058 0.2331 
INDCL3 0.0766 0.0262 2.9200 0.0040 0.0251 0.1281 
INDCL4 0.1384 0.0275 5.0200 0.0000 0.0843 0.1924 
INDCL5 -0.0103 0.0349 -0.2900 0.7690 -0.0788 0.0583 
STOCKMRT 0.1058 0.0614 1.7200 0.0850 -0.0148 0.2263 
LENDRT 1.7413 0.4334 4.0200 0.0000 0.8908 2.5918 
INFLATION 0.8228 0.3239 2.5400 0.0110 0.1870 1.4585 










Appendix 18: Pooled OLS regression with TDC and all factors 
Source SS df MS 
Number of 
obs = 915 
        F( 19,   895) = 26.74 
Model 18.008724 19 0.9478 Prob > F = 0.0000 
Residual 31.729558 895 0.0355 R-squared = 0.3621 
        
Adj R-
squared = 0.3485 
Total 49.738282 914 0.0544 Root MSE = 0.18829 
              
TDC Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
RISK -0.1705 0.2445 -0.7000 0.4860 -0.6503 0.3092 
ROA -0.7875 0.1159 -6.7900 0.0000 -1.0150 -0.5599 
SIZE 0.1594 0.0125 12.7100 0.0000 0.1348 0.1840 
GROWTH 0.0270 0.0200 1.3500 0.1780 -0.0123 0.0663 
CAPEX 0.0368 0.0750 0.4900 0.6240 -0.1104 0.1840 
TANG 0.1063 0.0403 2.6400 0.0080 0.0272 0.1854 
SGA -0.3036 0.0603 -5.0300 0.0000 -0.4219 -0.1852 
TAX -0.0528 0.0385 -1.3700 0.1700 -0.1283 0.0227 
DEPR 1.0399 0.3043 3.4200 0.0010 0.4428 1.6371 
INDLEV 0.4171 0.0819 5.0900 0.0000 0.2564 0.5777 
INDCL -0.0423 0.0185 -2.2800 0.0230 -0.0787 -0.0059 
INDCL1 -0.0295 0.0248 -1.1900 0.2350 -0.0783 0.0192 
INDCL2 0.0633 0.0510 1.2400 0.2150 -0.0369 0.1634 
INDCL3 0.0498 0.0231 2.1500 0.0320 0.0044 0.0952 
INDCL4 0.0973 0.0243 4.0100 0.0000 0.0497 0.1449 
INDCL5 -0.0307 0.0308 -1.0000 0.3190 -0.0911 0.0297 
STOCKMRT 0.0160 0.0541 0.3000 0.7670 -0.0902 0.1223 
LENDRT 0.0404 0.3819 0.1100 0.9160 -0.7092 0.7900 
INFLATION 0.2765 0.2855 0.9700 0.3330 -0.2839 0.8368 










Appendix 19: Pooled OLS regression with LDM and all factors 
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 915 
        F( 19,   895) = 51.19 
Model 18.3025 19 0.9632 Prob > F = 0.0000 
Residual 16.8416 895 0.0188 R-squared = 0.5208 
        Adj R-squared = 0.5106 
Total 35.1441 914 0.0385 Root MSE = 0.13718 
              
LDM Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
RISK -0.2242 0.1781 -1.2600 0.2080 -0.5737 0.1254 
ROA -0.4959 0.0845 -5.8700 0.0000 -0.6617 -0.3302 
SIZE 0.1025 0.0091 11.2300 0.0000 0.0846 0.1205 
GROWTH -0.0429 0.0146 -2.9400 0.0030 -0.0715 -0.0142 
CAPEX 0.0607 0.0547 1.1100 0.2670 -0.0466 0.1679 
TANG 0.4317 0.0294 14.7100 0.0000 0.3741 0.4893 
SGA -0.0284 0.0439 -0.6500 0.5190 -0.1146 0.0579 
TAX -0.0228 0.0280 -0.8100 0.4160 -0.0778 0.0322 
DEPR 0.3970 0.2217 1.7900 0.0740 -0.0381 0.8320 
INDLEV 0.0966 0.0596 1.6200 0.1060 -0.0205 0.2136 
INDCL 0.0232 0.0135 1.7200 0.0860 -0.0033 0.0497 
INDCL1 0.0248 0.0181 1.3700 0.1710 -0.0107 0.0603 
INDCL2 0.1947 0.0372 5.2400 0.0000 0.1217 0.2676 
INDCL3 0.0544 0.0168 3.2300 0.0010 0.0214 0.0875 
INDCL4 0.0225 0.0177 1.2700 0.2040 -0.0122 0.0572 
INDCL5 -0.0090 0.0224 -0.4000 0.6880 -0.0530 0.0350 
STOCKMRT 0.0392 0.0394 0.9900 0.3200 -0.0382 0.1166 
LENDRT -0.1357 0.2783 -0.4900 0.6260 -0.6818 0.4104 
INFLATION 0.5903 0.2080 2.8400 0.0050 0.1821 0.9986 










Appendix 20: Pooled OLS regression with LDC and all factors 
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 915 
        F( 19,   895) = 53.01 
Model 13.26058 19 0.697925 Prob > F = 0 
Residual 11.78264 895 0.013165 R-squared = 0.5295 
        Adj R-squared = 0.5195 
Total 25.04322 914 0.0274 Root MSE = 0.11474 
              
LDC Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
RISK -0.0153 0.1490 -0.1000 0.9180 -0.3076 0.2771 
ROA -0.4459 0.0706 -6.3100 0.0000 -0.5845 -0.3072 
SIZE 0.1002 0.0076 13.1200 0.0000 0.0852 0.1152 
GROWTH -0.0029 0.0122 -0.2400 0.8110 -0.0269 0.0210 
CAPEX 0.0700 0.0457 1.5300 0.1260 -0.0197 0.1597 
TANG 0.3655 0.0246 14.8900 0.0000 0.3173 0.4137 
SGA -0.0093 0.0367 -0.2500 0.8010 -0.0814 0.0629 
TAX -0.0172 0.0234 -0.7300 0.4640 -0.0632 0.0288 
DEPR 0.1768 0.1854 0.9500 0.3410 -0.1871 0.5406 
INDLEV 0.0712 0.0499 1.4300 0.1540 -0.0268 0.1691 
INDCL 0.0179 0.0113 1.5800 0.1140 -0.0043 0.0400 
INDCL1 0.0231 0.0151 1.5200 0.1280 -0.0066 0.0528 
INDCL2 0.1585 0.0311 5.1000 0.0000 0.0975 0.2195 
INDCL3 0.0470 0.0141 3.3300 0.0010 0.0193 0.0746 
INDCL4 0.0197 0.0148 1.3300 0.1840 -0.0094 0.0487 
INDCL5 -0.0123 0.0188 -0.6600 0.5110 -0.0492 0.0245 
STOCKMRT 0.0305 0.0330 0.9300 0.3550 -0.0342 0.0953 
LENDRT -0.4528 0.2327 -1.9500 0.0520 -0.9096 0.0040 
INFLATION 0.4557 0.1740 2.6200 0.0090 0.1142 0.7971 
_cons -0.5924 0.0673 -8.8000 0.0000 -0.7245 -0.4602 
 
